



Project Paper 2

Senegal Country and Research Areas Report

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Responsible institutions: **Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar (UCAD)**
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

Authors: **Papa Demba Fall**
María Hernández Carretero
Mame Yassine Sarr



University
of Antwerp
Belgium



International
Migration
Institute,
University
of Oxford
United
Kingdom



Centre on
Migration, Policy
and Society,
University
of Oxford
United
Kingdom



Peace Research
Institute Oslo
Norway



Koç University
Turkey



Université
Mohammed V
Agdal
Morocco



Centre of
Sociological
Research
Ukraine



Université
Cheikh Anta
Diop de Dakar
Senegal



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Introduction

Senegal, which is a small country because of its surface area and far from being an economic power, is nevertheless known all over the world. The country's fame and admiration throughout the world stem from its political stability and /or ability of its politicians who have been leading it since independence, from the *Lions of Teranga*, who are highly-talented footballers, its musicians including Youssou Ndour and Didier Awadi as standard-bearers, etc.

As an important host country for populations coming from different regions in Africa and in the world, the people of Senegal has always put forth its role as a land of encounter and dialogue of cultures. Despite an economic situation marked by uncertainty, these basic choices have not been questioned at all.

The new deal related to changes described above is the increasing involvement of all social segments of international working migration, particularly to the countries in the North. Indeed, the Senegalese youth and their family members see in mobility a way to solve the existential problems related to the degradation of environmental and economic conditions whose affect on production of material and financial resources is more than negative.

After presenting a rapid survey of the political and economic situation of Senegal, this report intends to make a detailed analysis of the four areas selected for research to assess two major questions:

- What are the popular perceptions of democracy and human rights in Europe in the selected study areas?
- What are the aspirations and intentions of these populations in the areas where they live?

Country Background

Some Key Indicators

- Surface: 196,712 km²
- Population density (2008): 63 inhabitants/km² **
- Population (2009 estimate): 12,171,265 inhabitants *
- Population growth (annual %, 2008): 2.67 **
- Gross Domestic Product (2008): 5.944 trillion FCFA *; approx. 9 billion EUR
- GDP per capita (cst 2000 US\$): 530.04 (2008) **
- Inflation rate (2008): 6.0% **
- Life expectancy at birth (2008): 56 **
- Human Development Index (2009): 0.464 (ranked 166th out of 182 countries)
- Literacy rate (2006): 41.9% (UNESCO)
- Youth female literacy rate (%females 15-24, 2006): 44.5% **
- Combined gross school enrolment rate (2008): 83.5% **
- Working-age population (2002): 64,2% ***
- Unemployment rate (2006): 11.1% ** (100,000 new work-seekers per year)
- State employees in 2009: approximately 80,000
- Informal sector: ¾ of all workers
- International migrants (2010): 2,000,000 – 3,000,000 (estimated)

Note: The CFA Franc has a fixed exchange rate of 1FCFA = 655.957€

cated at the westernmost point of mainland Africa, it borders with Mauritania to the North along the Senegal River, with Mali to the East and with Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau to the South. The Gambia, which extends along and around the River Gambia, represents an enclave within Senegalese territory, creating a geographic separation between the Senegalese region of Casamance to the South and the rest of the country to the North. To the West, the Cape-Verdean archipelago is located 560 km into the Atlantic Ocean from Senegal's coastline (ANSD 2009c:xxi). With an Atlantic coastal extension of 531 kilometres, fishing and tourism are important sectors of Senegal's economy.

Senegal has a Sudano-Sahelian climate characterised by two seasons: a dry season from November to May, and a rainy season from June to October. Rainfall is more abundant in the south of the country than in the semi-desert landscapes of the North (ANSD 2009c:xxi). With rainy seasons lasting only 4 months every year, Senegal has been affected by periodic droughts since the 1970s. The consequent effects on agriculture have significantly contributed to the gradual rural exodus towards Dakar and other cities.

The country's territory is covered by, among other, savannah (44%), agricultural fields (27%), steppe (18%), forest (4%), surface water (2%) and mangrove (1%) (ANSD 2009b). About two thirds of the country's land surface are covered in forest ecosystems. Deforestation poses a signifi-

cant problem for Senegal. From 1960 to 1996, the land surface covered in natural forests is estimated to have decreased by over 40%, from 11 million to 6.3 million hectares (ANSD 2009c:110-111). Peanut is the largest agricultural product. (See Figure 1)

The 10 September 2008 decree, which established the new distribution of the national territory, brings the number of Senegalese regions from 11 to 14. The three new regions – Kaffrine, Sedhiou and Kedougou – are for the moment too young to figure independently in the statistical overviews of the consulted sources.

Demographic Situation

Senegal's population was estimated at 12,171,265 inhabitants for the year 2009 (ANSD 2010),¹ having more than doubled since 1980, when the population was of approximately 5.6 million. Due to its growth rate of nearly 2.5%, Senegal's population doubles every 25 years. (See Figure 2 and 3),

The country has a predominantly young population: over half (53.3%) is under 20, and 63.3% under 25 years of age, while only 10% of the total population is estimated to be 50 or older (see figure below). There is a higher proportion of women (50.6% of the population) than men (49.5%) in Senegal (ANSD 2009c:24-25). For 2008, the average birth-rate² was estimated at 38.9 per thousand and the fertility rate at 5 children per woman (ANSD 2009c:27) (See Figure 4).

The Senegalese population is unevenly distributed across the country, with a higher concentration in the Western and Central regions. Population density is particularly high in the Dakar region. With an estimated population of nearly 2.5 million in 2008, the region had on average 4 545 inhabitants per km², whereas the overall country density was of 63 inhabitants per km². This high population concentration in Dakar points to the growing urbanisation of the country: 42% of the Senegalese population lives in urban settings, 58% in rural areas (ANSD 2009c:26). Table 2 shows the share of the Senegalese population living in each of the regions selected for the EUMAGINE study. It is worth underscoring that the Senegal region, with only 0.3% of the country's territory, hosts 21% of the total population (See Figure 5 and 6).

Political Situation

The Senegalese state is a democratic republic. Under France's colonial control, Senegal was part of French West Africa, which included today's Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin. Saint Louis (in the north of present-day Senegal) and later Dakar served as the capital of French West Africa and the headquarters of the colonial administration until independence in 1960. After decolonization, Senegal has followed a relatively peaceful and stable trajectory – it has not suffered any coup d'état or been under military or authoritarian rule. On account of this, the country has at times been hailed as an exceptional, or even exemplary, post-colonial West African state. In recent years, however, the evolution of Senegal's democracy is being severely tested by President Wade's increasingly anti-democratic approach. In addition to this, the Senegalese government continues to be seriously challenged by the continuing conflict in

¹ Other data estimates place Senegal's population at 14,086,103 for 2010 (The World Factbook 2010).

² Ratio of live births in a year over average population for that year.

the Casamance region, where the separatist MFDC (Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance) is claiming independence from Senegal.

Post-Colonial Period

After independence on April 4th 1960 and for a period of 20 years, the country was led by Léopold Sédar Senghor, of the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), under de-facto one-party rule. Senghor retired in 1980, handing over power to Abdou Diouf, who had been his Prime Minister since 1970.

Political liberties were limited during Senghor's presidency (1960-1980). In 1962, protests against alleged electoral fraud were harshly suppressed; in 1964 all political parties except the small African Reunion Party were banned; in 1973, Senghor was re-elected president in a one-party election, and ensuing protests led to arrests and the suppression of the teachers' union; and in 1975 two leaders of the recently legalized PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party) were jailed for voicing out "subversive discourses" (MAEC 2006:8-10). Following Senghor's retirement and Diouf's take-over in 1980, political restrictions were lifted and seven political parties were legalized in 1981 (Freedom House 2010). Diouf was re-elected through multi-party elections in 1983, 1988 and 1993, though the last two are considered to have been "unfair" by NGO Freedom House (2010).

The country records now over 75 political parties and the most important ones are: the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), the Socialist Party (PS –former UPS), and the Alliance of the Forces of Progress (AFP). Civil rights were expanded in the 1980s, with the concession of certain "negative" liberties (e.g. freedom of opinion and press), bringing the country closer to a more solid democracy. The Constitution approved in 2001 expressed Senegal's support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, Senegal has ratified the main international conventions related to human rights, and death penalty was abolished in 2004 (EU Commission 2007:8).

Wade Presidency

In 2000, Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) won the presidential elections, defeating Diouf and thus ending forty years of socialist rule. The ensuing peaceful transfer of political power between parties was hailed as "real democratic progress," and renewed popular hopes for a better state management (Fall 2010:9). Yet, instead of helping consolidate Senegal's democracy, "from a democratic perspective" historian Penda Mbow (2008:156) argues, Wade's presidency represents "a severe disappointment."

Indeed, President Wade's governmental style is being described, both in Senegal and abroad, as progressively anti-democratic or even leaning towards authoritarianism. Wade has introduced numerous amendments to the constitution "to increase executive power and to weaken the opposition" (The World Factbook 2010). In 2009, Freedom House lowered Senegal's rating for political rights from "free" to "partly free" on account of "the growing authoritarian power of the president and ruling party as well as the increasing marginalization of the opposition". Some of the constitutional amendments introduced by President Wade include reversing a reduction of the duration of presidential terms from seven to five years – which, together with a limitation to two presidential terms, were some of the changes included in the new constitution adopted by popular vote in 2001.

Still, Wade has announced that he intends to run for presidency in the 2012 election, which would presumably conflict with the two-term constitutional limit on presidency.

Although the opposition won the 2009 local elections, it remains weak and is hampered by a number of factors. For instance, the municipal elections have been postponed on repeated occasions and Wade accused of silencing political opponents. Participation in presidential and legislative elections has also become significantly more difficult over the past years. The fees required for political parties' candidates to participate in presidential and legislative elections have increased, respectively, from 6m FCFA (€9,000) in 2000 to 25m FCFA (€38,000) in 2007, and from 2m FCFA (€3,000) in 2001 to 15m FCFA (€23,000) in 2007. These rises are justified on the grounds of discouraging non-serious contenders (Diop 2010:17). While freedom of expression is "generally respected" and academic freedom "legally guaranteed and respected in practice" (Freedom House 2010), journalists and academics critical of Wade's politics have faced increasing restrictions, harassment, intimidation, or even imprisonment (AI 2010; Mbow 2008; The Economist 2009b; US DoS 2010a).

Corruption is considered to be a "serious problem" in Senegal (Freedom House 2010), and the political class is typically accused by the population of mispending the country's money. A recent high-profile scandal involving a "farewell gift" amounting to €50,000 and US\$50,000 in cash to the IMF Resident Representative in Senegal before his departure after the end of his term in office in October 2009 sparked widespread criticism (BBC News 2009; cf. IMF 2009). Another recent case in point is the building of the massive "Monument of the African Renaissance," which was inaugurated in April 2010 that cost US\$27m. The building of the 49-metre bronze statue was widely criticised by ordinary Senegalese who believe that the money should be prioritized otherwise. The President is said to be planning 35% of profits from visitors' fees to go to a foundation of his own, run by his own daughter (The Economist 2010).

Some critics have gone as far as branding Wade's approach as "dynastic" and stating that the president "reigns" instead of governing (Diop 2010:17; Mbow 2008:158). This criticism is related to the political ascension of President Wade's son. In May 2009, shortly after President Wade's party suffered an important loss in local elections – including in Dakar, where Wade's son Karim was the ruling PDS candidate – Karim Wade was appointed to head the newly-created Ministry of International Co-operation, Territorial Development, Air Transport and Infrastructure (The Economist 2009a). A month later, in June 2009, a new unelected position of vice-president was created, giving rise to speculation that President Wade may intend to assign his son to the post (Diop 2010; Freedom House 2010).

Still, according to Freedom House (2010), freedom of association and assembly are "guaranteed" and NGOs operate "freely". However, some problems are noted in the following areas: the judiciary is independent in theory but exposed to influences in practice; conditions for prisoners are sub-optimal and cases of physical abuse exist (Freedom House 2010; US DoS 2010a).

Freedom of religion is provided for in the Senegalese Constitution, and is "generally respected in practice" (Freedom House 2009; US DoS 2009:1262).

Homosexual practices are considered to be illegal in Senegal. Individuals suspected of engaging in homosexuality are subject to harassment, discrimination, arrest, torture, unfair trial or even impris-

onment. This has led some to flee the country. In recent years, several people have been arrested and/or imprisoned on such grounds (AI 2009:282, 2010:279).

The Casamance Conflict

An important political challenge for Senegal is the unresolved conflict in the southern Casamance region. The death in 2007 of MDFC (Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance) leader Diamacoune Senghor, who played a central role in the peace agreement signed in 2004, is considered to have created a “leadership problem” within the Movement, and to be possibly an obstacle to the peaceful evolution of relations with the Senegalese government (EU Commission 2007:9). Currently, sporadic violence on the part of alleged members of the MDFC continues, undermining the peace agreement. Hundreds have been forced to abandon their homes as a result of either military bombings or intimidation from alleged members of the MFDC (AI 2010:278-279). There are an estimated 10,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Casamance region (US DoS 2010a:15).

Socio-Economic Situation

Senegal experienced sustained positive annual economic growth at a rate of about 5% from the mid-1990s to 2005, which helped to decrease poverty incidence significantly. However, the Senegalese economy has faced difficulties in recent years. From 2006 onwards, the country’s economy has been significantly affected by the oil and food price crises and, from 2008 and to this day, by the effects of the global financial crisis (World Bank 2010). The OECD (2010) has warned that the country’s economic growth is likely to be slowed down by high youth unemployment; difficulties in achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the lack of dialogue between government and opposition, and the persistence of the Casamance conflict.

Senegal’s GDP (2008) was measured at 5.944 trillion FCFA in 2008 – approximately €9 billion (ANSD 2010). This means an approximate 501,978 FCFA, or €765, per capita, yearly. Though accurate, up-to-date are lacking, it is estimated that about one third of the Senegalese population (about 33.5%) is living under the national poverty line, and that nearly two-thirds (60.3%) live under \$2 a day (UNDP 2009:178). As an indicator of socioeconomic inequality, Senegal’s richest 10% are responsible for approximately 30% of all expenditure, while the bottom 10% only accounts for 2.5%. The country’s Gini index, measuring the degree of inequality in family income distribution, is 39.2 (the index ranges from 0-100, from perfectly equality to perfect inequality – the world’s countries fall in the approximate 25-75 range).

One of the main hurdles for overcoming poverty in Senegal is the important economic divide between Dakar and the largely rural remainder of the country (World Bank 2010). The need for decentralisation is acknowledged at the governmental level: in 2005 a National Program for Local Development was established. Still, the European Commission considers that more progress needs to be made in enhancing the financial, human and material means of local communities, as well as in dispersing the central administration (Republic of Senegal and European Community 2007:9).

In 2008, the primary sector of the economy, approximately half of which is dominated by agricultural production, contributed 14.7% of the country's total GDP. The secondary sector, dominated by construction, represented 19.8% of GDP, and the tertiary sector contributed 53.2% of GDP (ANSD 2009a:7-8).

Approximately 30% of the working-age population is employed full-time in the agricultural sector. This sector is, however, constrained by a number of conditions including irregular rainfall and low productivity, with much of the production at subsistence levels (ANSD 2009c:97). Peanut is the main agricultural production, but revenues are continually going down and production has recorded a twice-fold decrease since 2000. The country's agricultural crisis has materialized in the sector's decreasing contribution to the country's GDP while exacerbating rural exodus (Dahou and Foucher 2009:16).

Fisheries have also traditionally been an important sector in Senegal's economy, benefitting from rich waters. In late years, however, the sector has been in decline, and with it its contribution to the country's GDP: from 2.7% of GDP in 1997 to 1.5% in 2008. Overfishing and pollution are among the factors responsible for this decline (ANSD 2009c:129). Still, fishing provides the most important contribution to Senegal's exports, amounting to 22% of the total in 2007 (US DoS 2010b).

Many hoped that the political transition that came about with Abdoulaye Wade's victory in 2000 would bring about more attention to the needs of youth and households. These improvements have, however, failed to materialize to the point that recent statistics (ESAM-II) show that more than half of the Senegalese population lacks the resources to meet their basic needs (Fall 2010:9). In this context, the Senegalese population's indulgence towards its politicians could seem paradoxical, Fall (2010) remarks. Such a situation can only be understood, he explains, by taking into account the importance of religiosity in ordinary Senegalese people's daily lives: everyday challenges are attributed to God's will, and the better part of the population seeks salvation through membership in religious brotherhoods, or Sufi fellowships, and particularly the blessing of the *Serigne* or *Sheikh* (religious leader). Given this situation, he argues, the government has no "real obligation" to perform, and people believe that only their own physical and spiritual efforts will allow them to get by. Two slogans that are widely shared by Senegalese Muslims illustrate this conviction: *Yalla nopi na* (the fate was already sealed); *lou djoote yombe* (things happen when they are due to). Of similar foundations is the Murid saying which recommends its followers to "*work as if they would never die and pray to God as if they would die tomorrow*" (Fall 2010:9-10). Numerous works have commented on the omnipresence of religion in the daily life of Senegalese people (cf. Bava 2003).

In this context of socioeconomic decline, Dahou and Foucher (2009:17) argue that migration has become a crucial new element sustaining the Senegalese economy. Migrant remittances, they argue, are "one of the main engines of growth in the Senegalese economy today," as they fund consumption, which they point to as one of the main drivers of the current economy. Trade too, Dahou and Foucher suggest, benefits from migrants, who are largely responsible for connecting Senegal with the rest of the world.

Employment

Overall country unemployment was estimated at 11.1% for 2006 (World Bank data). Youth are particularly vulnerable. In 2001, a National Agency for Youth Employment, (ANEJ, *Agence nationale pour l'emploi des jeunes*) and a National Fund for Youth Employment (FNPJ, *Fonds national pour l'emploi des jeunes*) were established, but they have yet to yield the expected results (OECD 2010). With limited employment opportunities in the home market, migration is seen to act as a “safety valve” for many of the country’s numerous youths (Dahou and Foucher 2009; Mbow 2008).

In Dakar, the unemployment rate was estimated by the DPS (*Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique*) to be at 11.7% for 2002. The EU Commission (2007:15) has moreover warned that under-employment, which is a more realistic estimate of the state of employment, may be affecting close to 75% of the working-age population in Dakar. A Suburban-Youth Employment Office (OFEJBAN, *Office pour l'emploi des jeunes dans la banlieue*) was set-up in 2008 to address youth discontent with unemployment in the Dakar suburban area (OECD 2010).

Satisfactory remuneration for work represents an additional terrain of grievance. The national minimum hourly wage is US\$0.45 (209 FCFA), but this is not considered to be sufficient to cover the living expenses of the worker and his/her household (US DoS 2010a:34). In the informal labour market, the median monthly salary is below 30,000 FCFA, about €45 (Some 2009:39).

Education

Primary education, from ages 6-16, is compulsory and should be provided free of charge according to the law, although the lack of resources or facilities poses barriers to enrolment (US DoS 2010a:24). However, there are great disparities in literacy rates between rural areas and the capital, Dakar.

Adult literacy has increased from 39% in 2002 to 42% in 2006, and gross education enrolment was at 90% in 2009 (excluding Arabic education). Still, the share of the national budget allocated to eradicating illiteracy is noticeably small (0.23%) (OECD 2010). Girls’ education is given less priority than boys’, and only 25% of females above 15 are reported to be literate (US DoS 2010a:24). Senegal’s progress on the education-related Millennium Development Goals is nevertheless assessed as “significant” (OECD 2010) (See Figure 7 and 8).

Gender Equality

According to Freedom House (2010), women’s constitutional rights are “often not honoured”. Women also have fewer employment and education opportunities and the head of household is legally expected to be a male. There exists, however, a National Strategy for Gender Equity and Equality (SNEEG, *stratégie nationale pour l'équité et l'égalité de genre*), and the issue of gender equality is addressed through a number of ministries as well as associations (EU Commission 2007:9). Violence against women, in the form of domestic violence, is widespread but goes largely unpunished due to lack of law enforcement and women’s reluctance to report instances of abuse beyond the family (US DoS 2010a:20-21).

With a gender-related development index (GDI) of 0.457, Senegal ranks 140th of 155 countries on this gender development measure (UNDP 2009:183). The value for Senegal's Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is not available, however some relevant indicators can be found: Senegalese women earned the right to vote and to stand for election in 1945 and, according to UN data, 29% of all of the country's parliamentary seats and 18% of all ministerial posts are held by women. Senegal has a quota system aimed at ensuring a certain degree of female representation in parliament. The estimated ratio of female to male earned income is 55% (UNDP 2009:188).

Public Health

The average life expectancy for a Senegalese person is 56 years (2008 WB data). This is slightly above the average for Sub-Saharan African countries, 51.5 years (UNDP 2009:173-174). The infant mortality rate in Senegal is currently at 57 deaths per 1,000 live births (WB 2008 data), and maternal mortality is at 401 deaths per 100,000 live births (OECD 2010). Malaria prevalence was reduced by two-thirds in 2009, and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are at 0.7% (OECD 2010).

Cultural Situation

Senegal's population belongs to a variety of ethnic groups, of which the Wolof ethnic group is the largest. The representation of each ethnic group in the total population is as follows: 44.5% Wolof and Lébou (a subgroup of the Wolof), 25.2% Pular, 13.8% Serer, 5% Diola, 3.9% Mandinga and Sossé, 1.6% Soninké, and 6% other groups, including foreigners (DPS 2004:32-33).

The population of Senegal is predominantly Muslim (96%), with a small percentage of Catholics (4%). Senegal is a secular country. Senegalese Muslims practice Sufi Islam, and most of the population belongs to one of the four major Sufi brotherhoods: Qadiriyya (or "Khadrya"), the oldest and originating from Mauritania; Tijaniyyah (or "Tidjane"), which originated in Morocco and is the most widespread in Senegal; Mouride, originally founded in present-day Senegal by Cheikh Amadou Bamba; and the Layenne, which has its stronghold mainly in the Dakar suburb of Yoff. The most recent census data gives the following picture on the Senegalese population's identification with these brotherhoods: 8.7% Khadrya, 48.9% Tidjane, 31.9% Mouride, 0.6% Layenne and 5.5% Muslim not belonging to any of the four major brotherhoods (ANSD 2002).

Borders

Senegal shares borders with four other countries: Mauritania (813 km), Mali (419 km), The Gambia (740 km), Guinea-Bissau (338 km) and Guinea-Conakry (330 km). These borderlines have been engendered through historical negotiations and disputes. As Fall (2004:5) explains, during the colonial period the country's borders had to be settled with Portugal for the case of Guinea-Bissau, the United Kingdom in the case of The Gambia, and through confrontations between civil actors and the French military for the territories that currently belong to Guinea-Conakry, Mali, and Mauritania. As a result of these demarcations, the Soninke ethnic group was divided by the borderlines separating Mauritania, Mali and Senegal, and the Wolof and Mandinga separated by the Senegalo-Gambian border (Fall 2004:6).

In recent years, Senegal has been involved in border-related disputes with The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania (Fall 2004:6). Borders with the Gambia have undergone a number of reconfigurations since independence in the 1960s. Relations between the two countries were difficult in the period 1969-1974 due to boundary disputes and Senegal's concern with smuggling from The Gambia (Hughes 1992:202). In 1976, Senegal handed over 26 villages claimed by The Gambia (Fall 2004:6). Yet half a decade later, in February 1982, the two countries established the Senegambian Confederation following a Senegalese military intervention to neutralise a coup in The Gambia (Hughes 1992:200). Arnold Hughes (1992:202) attributes The Gambia and Senegal's interest to strengthen their ties to "a shared concern about internal security and anxiety about Libyan intentions in West Africa" during the late 1970s. "Almost encircled by Senegal, and often viewed as an extension of its larger neighbour," Hughes (1992:204) argues, "The Gambia cannot escape being drawn into Senegalese security considerations." Besides security concerns of a more political nature, the wish to put an end to the smuggling activities across the Senegalo-Gambian border was also a motivating factor in constituting the Confederation (Fall 2004:16).

Senegal's border with Guinea-Bissau is a very sensitive one, as it runs along the conflict-prone region of the Casamance, where the Diola-dominated Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) have violently opposed the central government in demand of independence since 1982. The Senegalese government accuses Guinea-Bissau of supporting the MFDC, providing its members with sanctuary and arms (Evans 2000:649). In addition to the Casamance issue, tensions between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau have also arisen over a disagreement on the maritime border separating the two countries. This dispute emerged in 1977, as Senegal defended the validity of the demarcation agreed between Portugal and France in 1960 but Guinea-Bissau rejected it. The dispute was arbitrated by the International Court of Justice from March 1985, and in July 1989 a tribunal of the ICJ pronounced an arbitral award to settle the case (Hartzenbusch 1992). The territorial dispute is thought to be related to the possibility of off-shore oil in the area (Fall 2004:6, footnote 14).

The relationship with Mauritania has been marked by the conflict that opposed the two countries which broke out in April 1989 and triggered the interruption of diplomatic ties from August 1989 to April 1992. The conflict erupted following border confrontations between Mauritanian herders and Senegalese farmers along the Senegal river, and was seen by both sides to have racial undertones (MAEC 2006:10). As Parker (1991:155) discusses, the area of the Senegal River basin was fraught with two important sources of tension, namely the long-standing cultural division between Arabs and black Africans, and the competition for natural resources in the area. The conflict provoked an exodus of thousands of Mauritians and Senegalese who had been living in the neighbouring country and, in fear of retaliation, returned to their homeland in the space of weeks or a few months.

Among all of Senegal's neighbours, relations with Mali have been the least problematic. It is alleged that President Wade endorsed a military coup d'état in Guinea in 2008 (The Economist 2009b).

(E) Migration Policies and Developments over the Past 30 Years

The Senegalese government has a proactive attitude to migration management and is involved in this issue at a number of different levels: reinforcing developing governmental capabilities related to migration management, including organizing labour migration flows and border control; expanding its institutional reach to include the community of Senegalese abroad, entering agreements with foreign governments to regulate migration flows, and seeking to diminish irregular migration.

The institutional efforts made to acknowledge the importance of Senegalese emigration is illustrated by the existence of a “Ministry of Senegalese abroad.” The economic potential of migrants was recognized already in the early 1980s. The first ministerial post charged with managing emigrants was set up in 1983 and in 1995 the High Council of Senegalese Abroad was established in order to respond to the demands of emigrants (Fall 2010:5-6). According to a recent report, Senegalese emigrants’ remittances to Senegal make up over 12% of GDP, but are largely directed to personal expenditure, especially household consumption and housing (Some 2009:59). The Senegalese government has shown an interest in encouraging its emigrants to make productive investments in the homeland, in order to contribute to its development (Gerdes 2007:3; Some 2009:59). Proof of the importance of emigrants’ political and economic influence is the increasing attention placed on their vote – notably, Wade’s 2000 election campaign was launched in the diaspora (Dahou and Foucher 2009:17).

In recent years, the Senegalese government has become increasingly involved in seeking to limit the extent of irregular migration flows originating in Senegal. Initiatives taken to discourage irregular migration include sensitization campaigns to inform aspiring migrants about the risks involved, strengthening the legislation applicable to smugglers, improving capacities to reintegrate returnees, and promoting employment opportunities (Some 2009:67). Among the latter, a notable example is the REVA initiative (from the French *Plan de Retour Vers l’Agriculture*), aimed at encouraging youth to return to agricultural activity. One of the main objectives of this program was to “fight against clandestine emigration and rural exodus by creating sustainable conditions for returning to the land” (ANSD 2009c:98, translation by authors). Some scepticism was voiced, however, about the ability of this kind of initiative to divert youth’s interest from emigration (Ba 2007).

The Senegalese government is also increasingly engaged in cooperating with foreign governments in the organization of regulated labour migration flows. This includes, for instance, managing labour demands from other countries through quota systems. In addition, as Dahou and Foucher (2009:18) point out, the Senegalese state has benefited from new inflows of foreign aid as a result of its heightened visibility in the dynamics of irregular migration flows from West Africa to Europe, especially after 2005.

Relations with Europe

For a long time in the Senegalese imaginary, Europe meant France. Nowadays, however, many look towards other countries such as Italy and Spain, which have become important destinations for Senegalese emigrants seeking work in Europe.

In recent decades, relations between Senegal and European countries have been marked by the evolution of policies of “co-development.” Significantly, this approach to international cooperation

policies, which gained momentum in France in the 1990s, brings a new and important role for migrants. Whereas the more traditional development dynamics only involved states, in “co-development” migrants become actors in the development process (as a kind of “interface” between the governments involved) and their interests are brought into policy discussions (Grillo and Riccio 2004). Grillo and Riccio (2004:108-109) show that the co-development approach is nevertheless fraught with tensions: On the one hand, it can be beneficial in bringing infrastructural or other improvements to regions that suffer from the neglect of national governments, as well as helping migrants carry out their own projects. On the other hand, co-development initiatives are prone to becoming entangled with migration policies: some authorities may be enthusiastic about them because they see them as indirect means to promote migrants’ return, or to diminish emigration in the first place.

Relationship with France

Senegal’s relationship with France has traditionally been a special one, due to the colonial ties between the two countries. This has, however, changed gradually as other countries such as Italy, the United States, or Spain have gained increasing importance as destinations for Senegal’s international migrants, especially unskilled labour migrants. France nevertheless remains a “favourite” destination for Senegalese students and members of the “élite.” Eurostat (2010) data indicate that 99,844 Senegalese-born persons were registered as living in France in 2005.

France’s policy towards Senegal, in particular in what concerns official development assistance, is guided by a “Framework Partnership Document.” The current document covers the period 2006-2010. France is Senegal’s main economic partner, and in turn Senegal is the main beneficiary of French Development Public Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. French development cooperation policy, particularly through its Co-Development policy, places an important focus on encouraging migrants to take an active role in promoting development in Senegal.³ Senegal and France signed a Co-Development Convention in 2000, aimed at promoting the contribution of France-based Senegalese migrants towards the development of their home country and at facilitating mobility, specifically for the purpose of professional training as part of co-development objectives (see Governments of France and Senegal 2000:206). Co-development activities between France and Senegal typically engage institutions and actors such as local authorities, NGOs and migrant home-town associations both in France and in Senegalese local communities (Grillo and Riccio 2004:100).

In September 2006 Senegal and France signed an agreement on the “concerted” management of migration flows (see Governments of France and Senegal 2006). This agreement includes cooperation on the following areas: monitoring and management of migration and mobility flows; border control and readmission of irregular migrants; and Senegalese migrants’ engagement with development in their home country. In 2006, France contributed experts to the readmission-related identification activities that took place on the Spanish Canary Islands as part of the “Hera” return operations. These operations, coordinated by European border agency Frontex, were set up to address the heightened influx of irregular boat migration to the archipelago.

³ See http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/senegal_233/france-and-senegal_5382/framework-partnership-document-france-senegal-2006-2010_8619.html, last accessed on July 28th, 2010.

Relationship with Spain

It is only in the last decade that Spain has gained prominence as a destination country for Senegalese emigrants. In 2009, there were 54,128 Senegalese-born persons registered as living in Spain (Eurostat 2010).

Spanish foreign policy towards Africa, including Senegal, is generally guided by the “Africa Plan” strategy document. The first edition of this document (2006-2008) was published in June 2006, in the midst of the heightened inflow of irregular boat migration from West Africa (mainly Senegal) to the Spanish Canary Islands.

In the 2009-2012 Plan, human rights and development cooperation are given high visibility. The Spanish government commits itself to integrating the “promotion and protection” of human rights “in all the general objectives and lines of action” of the plan. More specifically, this promotion is to be made “from an indivisible and holistic standpoint, including political, economic, social, cultural and environmental rights” (MAEC 2009:33). Among other development-related initiatives, Spain has signed a Basic Development Cooperation Agreement with Senegal, cancelled €65.5 million from Senegal’s external debt, and started preparations for establishing a Fund for Concession of Micro-credit (MAEC 2009:78-79). Senegal is also an important export partner for Spain, receiving 5.5% of exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (MAEC 2009:83).

Migration is an important focus of Spanish-Senegalese relations and cooperation. The Spanish government’s elaboration of the first Africa Plan has itself been interpreted as indicating a Spanish “awakening” towards Sub-Saharan Africa, brought about by the new relevance of the region, particularly with regards to migration, for Spanish politics (Gagrielli 2008). The 2006 intensification of arrivals of boat migrants to the Spanish archipelago received a great deal of press coverage. The Senegalese were the largest nationality group, representing more than half of the total number of unauthorized entrants to the islands in 2006 (Godenau and Zapata Hernandez 2008:73). Besides the release of the “Africa Plan”, the Spanish government launched an important “diplomatic offensive” seeking the cooperation of sending countries in managing the influx of migrants. Spain also sought the support of the wider European Union in controlling what it considered “a European problem.” This led to the launching of a series of surveillance operations coordinated by the European borders agency, Frontex, charged with patrolling the waters between Senegal, Cape Verde, Mauritania, and the Spanish Canary Islands.

These efforts must be seen in the light of the evolving trend whereby migration, especially irregular migration, has become entangled with security concerns on the part of receiving states. Some of the resulting effects have been to push migration management and control activities beyond the destination states’ borders (the so-called “externalisation” process) by increasingly engaging the cooperation of transit and sending states (Boswell 2003; de Haas 2008).

In this context of growing externalisation of migration management, Spain and Senegal signed a Cooperation Memorandum on matters of migration control. In 2006, the two governments clinched agreements to allow for a) joint patrolling of Senegalese waters, in coordination with the European borders agency Frontex, and b) the repatriation of Senegalese migrants intercepted upon arrival to Spain, and other Senegalese citizens staying irregularly in Spain. The Spanish government also sought to channel migration aspirations through institutionalized paths, establishing a quota pro-

gramme to regulate labour migration from Senegal to Spain. In addition, Spain granted the Senegalese government €20 million for development projects. The Senegalese government later announced that these funds would serve to fund the REVA initiative (Gagrielli 2008). Spain moreover assisted Senegal with training of border patrols and provision of equipment for patrolling operations. Other migration-related initiatives include the opening of an Employment and Social Affairs Council office in Dakar, establishing a project to set up twelve centres for professional training for youth in West Africa, and the institution of the Spain-ECOWAS Migration and Development Fund (MAEC 2009:80-81).

Some co-development initiatives are also to be found in Spain, though in a smaller scale than in France. One example is the MIDEL (“Migrations and local development”) programme, which, with support from the Catalan government and the EU, seeks to support development initiatives by Senegalese migrants settled in Catalunya (Republic of Senegal and European Community 2007:55 (Annex)).

Relationship with Italy

Starting in the 1980s, Italy has become an important destination for Senegalese migrants. According to Eurostat (2010), 55,865 Senegalese-born persons were registered as living in Italy as of 2009.

Senegal is the main recipient of Italian public development aid to West Africa, and together with trade and development cooperation, migration management is an issue of importance in the bilateral relations between the two countries. Cooperation on development and migration management matters (including tackling irregular flows) are seen as closely related: development cooperation is regarded as a channel to encourage migrants’ return to Senegal and to direct the use of migrant remittances (Italian MFA 2010). The “Commodities Aids” project, led jointly by the two governments, funded reinsertion projects for migrants returning from Italy to Senegal voluntarily (Diatta and Mbow 1999:248).

Co-development has not grown in Italy to the same extent as it has in France. Still, some initiatives have been taken bringing together immigrant associations and Italian institutions to put forth co-development projects, sometimes with local, national or EU funding (Grillo and Riccio 2004:102). The COOPI project, for instance, was financed by the EU and, with a timeframe of 18 months starting in December 2004, sought to support development-related initiatives by Senegalese migrants and associations, as well as establishing a co-development network linking migrants with entrepreneurs and institutions in both countries (Republic of Senegal and European Community 2007:55 (Annex)). Currently, the programme Plasepri (“Plateforme d’Appui au Secteur Privé et à la Valorisation de la Diaspora Sénégalaise en Italie”), financed by the Italian government, seeks to promote the Senegalese private sector by fostering the potential of the Senegalese community based in Italy.

In 2008, Italy signed a partnership agreement with Senegal to regulate labour migration (Some 2009:55). In what concerns irregular migration, Italy has participated in the EU project “Seahorse”, which is aimed at curbing irregular migration by sea (Republic of Senegal and European Community 2007:54 (Annex)).

Relationship with the European Union

Bilateral relations between the EU and Senegal on the subject of development cooperation are guided by the 2000 Cotonou partnership agreement signed between the ACP countries and the European Community (Republic of Senegal and European Community 2007:7).

Due to the relevance of Senegal as country of origin, departure and transit in the context of the heightened flow of irregular boat migration to the Canary Islands in 2006, irregular migration and migration management have become prominent themes in Senegal-EU relations (Republic of Senegal and European Community 2007:20). As a consequence, they are addressed throughout the Country Strategy Paper for Senegal (2008-2013) that lays out the framework for cooperation between the European Commission and Senegal. Irregular migration is mentioned in relation to issues of economic growth and poverty reduction, more specifically employment creation among youth and the link between migration and development.

A Mobility Partnership agreement is currently under negotiations between the EU and Senegal. Mobility partnerships, initially known as “mobility packages,” developed from the November 2006 EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Development. They are intended to facilitate circular migration, and with it improved access to the EU for the citizens of certain third countries. The partnerships belong to a larger framework of relations between the EU and third countries that also includes cooperation on such issues as development aid, visa facilitation, temporary migration and irregular migration (Cassarino 2009).

Migration⁴

General Migration History

If since the early 1980s, long-distance migration took centre stage, internal mobility is nonetheless important and revealing of new social and/or spatial dynamics. It is for this reason that research conducted in Senegal and political national programs such as the PRSP focus on the movement of population, particularly on the long-distance migration that is seen as a development factor.

Internal Migrations

If urban areas are heavily affected by internal and international mobility, rural society is particularly affected by rural exodus resulting from the irregularity of rainfall and degradation of the ecosystems that have a negative impact on agricultural activity which is the main source of income for 60% of the working population.

The tables below give an idea of the intensity of internal mobility (See Figure 9):

Besides rural exodus, inter-regional trade, which expresses people's willingness to get a source of income or a job, reflects eloquently regional differences. These are the result of territory development void of proper guidance. Regional disparities account for the differences noted in the volumes of demographic flow as well as the loss of impetus for the seven of the eleven regions that existed in Senegal at the time of the survey (See Figure 10).

Several reasons account for the growth recorded in the four regions with positive net migration: the status of administrative capital and main economic hub for Dakar, the expansion of the religious city of Touba, which reflects the influence on the region of Diourbel, the implantation of settlers involved in the cultivation of cotton and groundnut, which has revitalized parts of the South West (Tambacounda and Kolda).

In addition to internal movements, the international mobility of people has become, as a result of the economic crisis, a major fact of Senegalese people's demographic behaviour.

⁴ It is to be noted that the data produced by the National Agency of Demography and Statistics can certainly help appreciate the quantitative dimension of the phenomena that are studied but, like many developing countries, the production of regular statistics depends crucially on the provision, on development partners, financial and material resources to institutions. Besides the confusion between migration flows and stocks, the problem of measuring the volume of Senegalese expatriation is related to its spontaneous nature, particularly since the abolition of prior authorization from leaving the country in 1981.

International Migrations

Senegal lost its status of immigration country in the early 1980s to become an emigration country (Fall 1998). The trend stems from a more sustained expatriation that affects all the regions in Senegal with a negative net migration as consequence.

The increase in migration flow is due to several factors that have increased over the years. This is accompanied by a shift in the centre of gravity of international migration in the Senegal River Valley to the Groundnut Basin and a greater involvement of groups that hardly left their country, the Wolof ethnic group, to be specific, who are affiliated with the Murid Muslim community.

In 2010, the number of international migrants is estimated at nearly 2 million people for a total population of 12 million. Well documented in terms of its historical development and stages, the migration process in Senegal can be divided into two waves: the movements inspired by successive droughts and the impoverishment of rural areas, movements subsequent to the choice policies that led to the destruction of industries as diverse as fisheries and textiles.

According to the literature on mobility, it was as a result of the deepening urban crisis in the 1970s that urban/rural migration or seasonal movements began to move to neighbouring countries before reaching the rest of the African continent. The phenomenon accentuated in the 1980s/1990s, which constituted a pivotal time in migration shift.

During that decade, the migration geography was increasingly marked by the emergence and/or confirmation of new emigration territories, whose real statistic scope remains unknown⁵, and diversification of departure zones.

In addition to the magnitude of migration, the works carried out in Senegal over the last twenty years indicate that the migration field has changed considerably both in terms of host countries and emigration basins.

The first international labour migrations date back from the Second World War. They are carried out, in large proportions, by the populations of the Senegal River Valley (Soninke and Haalpular ethnic groups or *Francenaabe*), who created in the late 1960s, the first associations designed to develop their home region.

The crisis following the economic reforms is an important milestone in the expansion of international migration for the ethnic groups who had little part in that (map below). From this period dates the emergence of the Groundnut Basin and the region of Dakar, which has gradually emerged as the main migration, transit, and return hub (See Figure 11).

⁵ The 1976 (RGP) and 1988 (RGPH) censuses do not provide real knowledge about international migration; only the 1970-70 (EDN), 1993 (ÉMUS) and 2004 (ESAM II) surveys deal with migration flows and stocks. To have an overall view of emerging evolutions, see Bredeloup (1995a) and Fall (2007b).

Current Picture of International Migration in Senegal

Although available data focus on the migration flows recorded during the period 1992-1997, the charts drawn from the results of the ESAM-II survey give an idea of the overall profile of new international migrants in Senegal.

Stronger Presence of Women

Senegal is still very far from the world rate of female involvement in migration, which is around 49% (United Nations 2009), but significant progress is noted in this regard. According to the survey ESAM-II (DPS 2004), 16% of the migrant populations are female (See Figure 12).

Just like most emigration countries, the first migration flow exclusively involved men and adults before touching women. As demonstrated by different authors, women's involvement in internal migration is a common practice in Senegalese rural areas where the dry season is being used to find additional resources in urban centres. This practice has, for decades, assumed a very distinct ethnic nature. It still appears to be the domain of young girls of the Diola ethnic group from the Casamance region and the Serer women from the Sine region.

The presence of women in long-distance migration is the subject of scattered references in the scientific literature including "businesswomen" or Adja engaged in a "naria" between Dakar and some commercial capitals such as Banjul, Casablanca, Jeddah, Istanbul, New York and most recently Bangkok, Dubai or Beijing. This form of migration has nothing to do with the number of Senegalese expatriate women who are intrinsically linked to poverty and/or degradation of environmental conditions (Eurostat 2000).

Until recently, the Senegalese society did not encourage migration abroad of unaccompanied women, especially when this includes long distances and lack of family member or close relative in the host country. It follows that migration flows were formerly dominated by female students and wives of migrants permanently settled abroad. Today, the migration of single women in search of better economic and social status is an observable reality across the country. The recent ESAM-II survey reveals that there are more women than men among recent migrants who left for the United States and Canada (9% against 7%).

The cumbersome socio-cultural procedures (the weight of tradition and influence of Islam) and legal procedures (restrictions on family reunification in the host country) are still significant obstacles to the significant presence of women in migration flows, but they nevertheless play a central role in the migration process, in particular as regards its financing and "distance" of management of players.

Two categories of women must be carefully distinguished from those who actually participate in international mobility:

- Women, who are involved in migration because of their dependent status based on marriage, kinship, etc., are grouped under the generic term of attendants;
- Women who take part in the movement as leading actresses.

Increasingly Young Migrants

Senegalese migrants are mostly men aged 18-35 years. They start as singles or without their spouses if married.

Surveys indicate that they are generally poorly educated or not at all even if there has been, in recent years, greater involvement of intellectuals. For women, they have the primary characteristic of being younger than men at the time of departure (74% of migrants are between 15 and 34).

According to ESAM II, international migrants are aged 15 and over. Among them, those aged 15-29 years are the majority (57.1%). Men outnumber women regardless of age group for particular age groups 15-29 and 30-54. Women are more represented in the age group 15-29 years (See Figure 13).

An Outstanding Entry of Wolof Ethnic Group

The ethnic profile of migrants has changed considerably. Migration involves now all ethnic groups. The migrants commonly called Wolof *Modou Modou*⁶ group are now the leading international migration group (See Figure 14).

Greater visibility for women, women are all involved in African migration in the intercontinental flows, especially to Europe (41.1% of flows) (See Figure 15).

At the sub-regional level, female migration field is essentially limited to four countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Togo. Though many arguments rule out that this is not an accompaniment migration as the Senegalese people's world leading destination, The Gambia, despite its geographical proximity, does not host a significant number of women (See Figure 16).

Women Fund International Migration

While women lag far behind men in terms of personal migration funding with 17.9% of cases, they rank first when travel fees are paid by a head of family, a family member, a distant relative, a person living abroad (See Figure 17).

Because they need an immediate answer to basic needs, they are more likely to mobilize their resources to pay travel fees and gain social status through the effects of migration. Indeed, providing for the family is more incumbent upon women than men.

Conflict-Induced Mobility

Though "economic migration" represents the bulk of Senegalese mobility dynamics, some conflict-induced mobility also exists. This is most significant internally: as of 2008, between 10,000-70,000 people were estimated to be internally displaced. Another 15,900 Senegalese lived in another country with refugee status as of 2007, representing 3.3% of the country's overall emigrant stock

⁶ Name given to migrants from the Wolof ethnic group hailing from the centre of Senegal, particularly the *Baol-Baol*, the *Saloum-Saloum* and the *Ndjambour-Ndjambour*.

for that year. In the global picture, Senegalese refugees only contributed about 0.1% to the world's refugee population in 2007 (UNDP 2009:157).

Migration Flows within the African Continent

Once targeting France and the French colonies in Africa for historical and linguistic reasons, Senegalese migration field has become multipolar and fluctuating.

Available data indicate that Africa remains the main destination continent for international migrants, but Europe, South America and North America made an outstanding entry into the Senegalese migration field. In fact, the Senegalese migration field has been experiencing significant changes since the early 1990s. They are marked by a more systematic orientation flows to the North. According to the Planning and Statistics Department (2004), 54% of the Senegalese who went abroad between 1999 and 2004 chose to settle in Europe (46%) and in the USA (8%) against 44% in Africa (14% in the UEMOA area and 30% in the rest of the continent).

According to the survey conducted over the last 6 months of the year 2007, migrants' main destination is Europe (68.0%) followed by "other African countries" (15.2%) and ECOWAS member countries (11.2%). The other destinations only host 5.6% of international migrants.

The same source indicates that the proportion of migrants varies according to the destination, the sex and the age group. Indeed, most people prefer the destination Europe whatever the sex (70.8% men and 61.8% among women). The destination "other African countries" is more prevalent among the age group 15-29 years among men and among the age group 30-54 years among women (57.0%). As for the destination ECOWAS, it is a destination mostly selected by the age groups 30-54 years (25.7%) among men and 15-29 years (9.6%) among women (See Figure 18).

African Destinations

Senegalese migration flows are certainly characterized by a subregional approach, but they also extend to the entire continent.

The African continent is certainly the first host for Senegalese migrants, but the leading destinations such as Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon are losing ground today. As for the neighbouring countries such as The Gambia, Mauritania and Mali, they receive about 40% of current flows.

Underestimated in the available statistics, the presence of Senegalese in Africa is essentially the result of two waves that are very difficult to sort out:

The great migration related to the call for skilled labour for the construction of the French territories in Africa such as Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Guinea⁷;

The contemporary migration driven by economic reasons (Cameroon, Congo, Angola, etc.).

⁷ The prize goes undoubtedly to the labors from the public buildings and works sector that were hired by Dakar-based French companies. One can list out to their names, the construction of many public buildings, of which two presidential palaces in Gabon.

Because of the political and economic instability and/or xenophobia in the host country, the circular nature of migration in Senegal is becoming more assertive. In this report, three migration fields are identifiable today:

- Anchors or destinations with very high migration stock like Gabon or Cote d'Ivoire;
- Redevelopment areas, particularly South Africa since the end of apartheid (Blion 1996; Croucher 2004);
- Transit areas such as Morocco with "figures of passage" that are migration candidates to Europe by the "Strait of Death."⁸

Presence of Migration Systems with Neighbouring Countries

Favoured by the tradition of welcoming foreigners, the migrations resulting from political and social realignments space in West Africa are part of a continuity that ultimately gives meaning to the concept of *Teranga* (hospitality toward foreigners) which is claimed as the hallmark of the Senegalese people.

If the recent trend does not contradict the continuity of the tradition of openness and integration of migrants, it must be acknowledged that since independence, freedom of movement has been subject to controls dictated by sporadic crises: split in the Federation of Mali, political tensions with the regime of Sekou Toure, war of independence by PAIGC, etc.

Still, lack of natural barriers makes difficult any control of borders whose permeability is proved: no relief, no impassable river and big forest.

The crisis between Senegal and Mauritania that broke out in April 1989 illustrates the idea that the transformation of border "barriers" remains a challenge for the post-colonial state. Indeed, in the midst of the conflict between the two countries and in the absence of effective policy, only the involvement of religious leaders - whose ties date back to the Islamization of the south of the Sahara - helped restore calm or save the lives of thousands of people living in the territory of the neighbour. It was also in the same spirit that, even before the resumption of official ties, the pilgrimages by Mauritanian or Senegalese communities affiliated to Sufi leaders installed on both sides of river continued.

Migration to Northern Countries

While the Senegal River Valley was originally the main emigration basin of Senegal (Daff 1999; Delaunay 1984; Scales-Trent 1999), the populations living in the centre of the country (regions of Diourbel and Louga) are increasingly represented in the long-distance migration mainly oriented towards Schengen area. From 10-12% of international migrants settled in countries in the North in 1960 while migrants from the Groundnut Basin increased by almost 40% of migration flows in 2000.

⁸ See report by the Brazilian photographer Sebastiao Salgado taken for *El Pais* (supplement) issued on September 7, 1998 or *Photographs: Sebastiao Salgado, 1-Ceuta*, Amazonas-Contact Press images, September 1997.

European Destinations

France: A Major Destination

For historical reasons, France, former colonial power, remains a stronghold of Senegalese migration field.

The first Senegalese migrants to France are the Soninke, the Toucouleur and the Mandjack. They arrived after the First World War following the lifting of the ban on landing of seamen hired in the ports of the long transatlantic ocean-going of Marseille, Bordeaux, Le Havre and Dunkirk (Diarra 1968).

The second wave of migration to the region of Paris, particularly between 1945 and 1970, consisted mainly of students - who comprised the Senegalese intellectual elites of independence - and workers hired in the "reconstruction of the Hexagon" (Daff 1999).

Since 1974, migration protectionism driven by the growing number of cases of xenophobia has had four major effects:

- Reduction in the bare minimum of the introduction of Senegalese workers in France: 25 people in 1989 and 18 in 1990;
- Call for help for the return or resettlement in their countries of origin, however, has been declining over the years: 205 candidates in 1985 and 182 in 1986 to 93 in 1987 45 in 1988; 17 in 1989 and 6 in 1990;
- Substantial limitation of immigration flows for family reunification (2,154 people between 1987 and 1990 with 1,094 wives and 1,060 children);
- Opening of new migration destinations such as Italy, Spain, and the United States of America that have completely broken with the traditional movements from the players' point of view.

Italy: The New Eldorado

With the volume of migration flows it has attracted in recent years and the place it occupies in the minds of many potential migrants, the Italian peninsula is the ideal archetype to analyze the process of conquest and consolidation of what is called now the new fields of migration towards the North.

Object of curiosity in the early eighties, the "small community" of Senegalese consisted of forty students from the universities of Perugia and Bologna and "professionals" selling crafts from Africa (Schmidt di Friedberg 1993). The latter category consisted mainly of people from the Laobe ethnic group roaming the beaches and towns of the peninsula from their base in Marseilles or Paris (Salem 1983; Sané 1993). Concurrent with short-term movements, between 1981 and 1984, an unprecedented labour migration included essentially people who had already had experience in traditional emigration homes (Mottura 1992). This first wave will pave the way for hawkers, directly hail-

ing from Senegal, who stay regularly in Italy to sell goods brought from Dakar before buying manufactured products which are distributed through networks of informal trading in the cities of Senegal and Africa. Over the years, new categories of seasonal migrants will end up moving (Khouma 1990): these are the vuccumpra or macaroni who roam the inner cities to discover the charms of the Italian population and the aggressiveness of local business they have long practiced in the markets of Dakar, including Sandaga market.

The current wave since the 1970s⁹ has gained some formerly little-used linguistic communities whose specificity lies in the root of the pioneers involved in migration as illustrated by the following three examples:

- The conquest of Spain (Suarez-Navaz 1995) was undertaken by the group of professions like the antic dealers and the craftsmen gathered into associations. The movement was first extended to people living along the border with The Gambia before gaining all the regions of Senegal;
- Germany welcomes mainly artists and athletes (Marfaing 2003:29). Estimated at 2,660 people, Senegalese migrants come from tourist areas including Senegal's Small Coast. In 2000, Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Munich and Bremen were the main cities hosting Senegalese;
- After having raised many questions in the early 1980s, the presence of Senegalese in the United States of America is now underway (Kane Mbaye 1998). From 666 migrants between 1972 and 1986, the number of Senegalese increased from 10,000 in 1990 to about 20,000 in 1997. New York City, Atlanta and Houston are the main Senegalese villages (see Allon 1995; Macmillan 1994), whose population is mostly composed of educated young people in large Senegalese urban centres, particularly girls.

Increasing Irregular Migration

Since the increasing demand of mobility from the countries of the South comes in a context when migration protectionism is the current standard in the North, the migration project designed for African youth is a prerequisite for risk-taking in "buffer zones" such as the Maghreb. It is in a move to reinforce these areas that the fight against irregular migration from the African coast entered a new phase in August 2006 with the effective implementation, by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the Union, Frontex, of a series of patrolling and return operations aimed at curbing the influx of Sub-Saharan irregular migrants to the Canary Islands.

Given the strengthening and/or sophistication of measures to monitor sea routes to Europe, migrants will then resort to desperate attempts such as taking storm of Gourougou and Ben Younech,

⁹ It was in the early seventies that the Murid populations from the Baol region, including those from the villages polarized by Lambaye embarked on international migration to Europe, in particular France.

“Ceuta fences” on the nights of 28 -29 September 2005. Indeed, it was in the early 1990s that the West African migration to the Old Continent struggled to cross the Maghreb¹⁰.

The “survivors of the desert,” who arrived after perilous crossing of the trans-Saharan routes, are obliged to renegotiate their lives and to stay in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya. To that end, they had to embark on activities enabling them to survive and /or continue their journey.

One of the major consequences “for expanding European frontiers to the Maghreb space” has been, since early 2006, the emigration candidates’ withdrawal to the South and the resort to canoes to try to reach European Eldorado from West African fishing ports. As an immigration country in the West African region, and a point of departure to reach Europe, Senegal has become a transit country linking two free movement areas: the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the Schengen zone. As discussed in the Migration Profile accompanying the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper for Senegal (2008-2013), this puts Senegal in a difficult position: Taking a tough stance to curtail the country’s role as a transit point for West African migrants intending to reach Europe through clandestine routes would require reinforcing control in its own borders. Such a policy would clash with the ECOWAS principle of free movement of people and jeopardize the political and economic stability of the region (Republic of Senegal and European Community 2007:46 (Annex)).

The increasing obsession of young candidates to travel to Europe compels them to engage in a migratory movement that exposes them to criminal networks and/or perilous initiatives.

Two bypassing strategies, all risky ones, have succeeded in time and led to awareness about the seriousness of the situation:

- A surreal drama, a dramatic event with an aircraft took place at Leopold Sedar Senghor Airport in Dakar where, in January 1999, a seventeen-year old young Senegalese - who had miraculously outlived a trip in the landing gear of an Airbus ensuring the Dakar-Lyon flight - died while trying his luck under the same conditions. The police found his body in the undercarriage of a plane that landed in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. A few months later, on 1 August 1999, two teenagers from Guinea tried the same adventure in Conakry-Gbessia. Their message - if you see us sacrificing ourselves it is because we, the children, are suffering a lot in Africa - wrote three days ago and sent to European leaders shook the African community as a whole;
- The exodus in canoe or *gaalu looco* from the coasts of Mauritania and Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, Cape Verde, etc., emerged as an alternative to the closure of *yoanou souf* (sandy crossing track or desert) that leads to the Maghreb (Bensaad 2005). Until the Ceuta’s event in September 2005, transit through Morocco, Algeria and Libya, once the rule, becomes the exception because of the European policy of External Borders.

The *mbëkk*¹¹, which made its appearance in December 2005 along the coast of Senegal, has benefited from the experience of artisanal fishing boats to land in the Canary Islands. The success

¹⁰ The key dates of this development are: the establishment, in 1991, by Spain, of a visa for Africans from the North as well as the setting up in the Strait of Gibraltar, in 1999, of SIVE (Integrated System of External Vigilance).

of the first crossings drew a crowd of candidates to West African or Asian networks established along the Atlantic coast. Some 32,000 migrants were registered as having crossed into the Canary Islands through unauthorized channels in 2006, most of them West African migrants who presumably left the Atlantic coast to reach the islands (Godenau and Zapata Hernandez 2008:72-73). Other sources indicate that they were reportedly 25 to 28,000 who had left Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, etc. Prior to 2006, the highest peak in arrivals to the Canary Islands was in 2002, estimated at 9,929 people. To get an idea of the human cost of the outsourcing of the European border controls, to those migrants who landed in the Canaries during the summer of 2006 should be added the additional thousands who drowned and all those still stuck in the desert or in detention camps.

The repatriation of migrants to their countries of origin or to their last transit countries have certainly sparked off the indignation of the human rights activists, but they have continued in defiance of increasingly vigorous protests (MIGREUROP 2006; Wender 2004). This is the case of the air routine which helped in June 2007, with the discrete support of the Senegalese police, to repatriate to St. Louis, in Senegal, nearly 200 irregular immigrants who managed to reach the Canary Islands.

Senegalese Migration Networks

Like the different migration patterns observed in the world, Senegalese emigration is based on social networks that facilitate the reception and integration of newcomers.

Although composed of subsets that bear distinctive marks of different ethnic groups that make them up, the Senegalese communities abroad form a united block in their countries of residence. Management structures that are put in place are rooted in Islam and in the specific cultural values of immigrants and not in the number. The places of worship and the Sufi groups (the *xadaratul Jumaa* or the gathering during the nights of Thursday to Friday of the populations of the Valley or Daira Murid), and cultural events are a common denominator around which to build and consolidate migration practice and homogenization of identity.

The many associations based on occupation, caste, ethnicity, region or town of origin are not intended to claim rights, but they are, especially in times of crisis, the essential bodies for the Senegalese administration and/or host country. Through them, the migrant can almost always overcome the daily obstacles of migration despite the shortness of networks.

The crisis has certainly undermined the solidarity displayed by the legendary primary migrants, but it has also given way to a proliferation of networks. The mutual aid structure is certainly not always visible, but they can, on occasion, mobilize and inspire a new dynamism among migrants.

The research conducted in Guinea and Gabon show some major aspects of the changing patterns related to integration in host countries.

¹¹ In Wolof language *mbëkk* is a practice used for sheep. It consists in butting. Among the Lébou ethnic group, the expression refers to the fish that is caught in the fillet and which has no other means than attempting, at any cost, to slip through the net. For extension or analogy sake, *mbëkk* means the desperate attempt to cross into Europe before the closure announced by the European Union.

The developments observed in Conakry, in Guinea, show that the fall in status of the Senegalese mosque, once the main engine of sectarian solidarity, is due to the dispersion of Senegalese migrants in the city, but also the diversity of legal migration created by the juxtaposition of movements spread in time.

Since the community could no longer articulate solidarity around a common ideal, the migrants prefer individual strategies to the detriment of collective ones. We note in the case of the traders of the Medina market that such a choice involves relinquishing identity references which only helps melt into trans-ethnic networks and succeed in migration project. The market appears to be a transnational space where various cultures live smoothly next to one another.

Fruit of the first African cooperation agreements signed under the aegis of OCAM in the early 1970s, legal migration of Senegalese to Gabon for skilled workers recruited in Dakar as a result of calls for tender launched by the authorities of that country with the Senegalese government and foremen employed by French companies for public works.

The Senegalese expert, widely sought in the work of construction of the Trans-Gabon, the ore port Owendo, exploitation of deposits of Moanda, etc., encouraged an influx of laborers who had no trouble to work in sites such as construction of homes in La Peyrie, Batavia, Abenelan or Noumba-kele.

Expression of the operation and process of Senegalese migration, community gathering in foreign land secretes a specific culture aiming at meeting requirements related to remoteness and migrants' integration. In providing migrants with a shelter needed for their proper integration, the community of origin becomes then the main reference for the migrant. In response to numerous difficulties related to the crisis, new migration strategies have been noted particularly among African migrants: renouncement of community gathering, systematic repatriation of funds, reconciliation with the local population through marriage or sport, etc.

Link Between Internal and International Migration

Extension of the internal migration of the Baol-Baol, the Lambaye Lambaye and other pioneers of rural exodus, international migration has emerged as a result of urban crisis, particularly during the years called structural adjustment, and deepened in the early 1990s dubbed "Sakho-Loum Plan," allusively to the economic recovery policy advocated by the Economy and Finance Ministry of that time.

Faced with increase in urban crisis, Dakar and the secondary cities become less attractive because they offer few employment opportunities. Understandably, one easily sees why international migration tends increasingly to "jump" the city of Dakar to go to Europe or America.

Fuelled by the strong conviction that one has only to reach Europe to find work and support their family, the European dream of Senegalese youth and their families rise in a crescendo.

Originally, we observe that international migration was exclusively performed by the rural people pejoratively called *Modou Modou*. In a shift in meaning due to citizens' involvement in the exodus,

the term has come to apply positively to all international migrants belonging to the Wolof ethnic group.

The choice of migration destinations remains variable and controlled by the geographical origin of candidates for migration and the curricula of their families. It is observed that townsmen have preference for the countries in the North and rarely do they migrate to Africa, while rural people as those “people of the Middle Valley of Senegal” go mostly to Congo or Gabon that are the most favourite destinations in villages such as Dodel or Coggal.

Foreign Presence in Senegal

Although its number has sharply declined during the period 1980-1995, the legendary hospitality that has earned Senegal the nickname of country of *teranga* makes it a great destination, especially for West Africans. In 2005, foreigners already accounted for 2.8% of the total population.

As of July 2, 2003, statistics provided by the Home Affairs Ministry put the number of migrants registered in Senegal to 29,926 people: 24,040 men against 5,866 women.

The World Bank pegged the stock of immigrants at 325, 940 in 2005, of whom 40, 2% were women.

According to UN data, in 2005 Senegal hosted 220,200 immigrants. Women accounted for 51% of them, and altogether immigrants in 2005 made up 2.0% of the total population in Senegal. By 2010, the number of immigrants is expected to decrease to approximately 210,100 (UNDP 2009:145).

The top ten source countries of migrants are in order as follows: Guinea, Mauritius, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, France, Cape Verde, Gambia, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic and the United States America (See Figure 19).

Of Senegal’s immigrant population in 2007, 20,400, or 9.3% of the total, were refugees and 2,500 of them were asylum-seekers awaiting a resolution to their claim (UNDP 2009:157).

The foreign population living in Senegal has invested in fields that have become their private niches. Therefore, Guineans of Conakry control the trade in fruit while Malians are very active in dyed fabrics selling.

The smooth presence of new migrants is fundamentally linked to the fact that they do not compete with the natives. They embark on economic sectors that are left in the lurch by the natives. Therefore, Ghanaians are specialized in the sale of cosmetics while Nigerians have engaged in the distribution of vehicle accessories and equipments.

There is, however, need to note that the revival in attraction exerted by Senegal on African people does not account for the product of the host country’s good economic health, but rather for the social peace that prevails there.

Except for the Chinese community, whose recent establishment along the Allée du Centenaire - real China Street - has sparked strong reactions from major retailers and local residents, foreigners are not subject to any form of ostracism or discrimination.

It is, however, regretful that public action toward foreigners living in Senegal only focuses on the security dimension of the management of migrants. Apart from regulations that deal with the conditions of stay and naturalization, no institutional mechanism is provided for their socio-professional integration.

Migrating to Senegal and Naturalization

Under the Law No. 89-42 of 26 December 1982, the acquisition of the Senegalese nationality results from a decision of the public authority upon request by the applicant. The latter must have resided continuously in Senegal for 10 years at least. This period has been reduced to 5 years for those married to a Senegalese citizen, those who have rendered outstanding service to the nation, spent five years in government or public institution.

The long-established communities with large numbers of members born in Senegal: 59.61% of Benin, 41.19% of Ivorians, 38.38% of Burkinabe, 24.63% of Nigeriens.

Due to lack of statistical data, people know very little about the status of these very discreet people. If children were almost all born in Senegal, their integration poses many challenges including access to the Senegalese nationality, including the slowness of the procedure:

"I arrived in Dakar in 1949 at age 17 ... I am a Senegalese as my Senegalese children who were born here. But I have no official document. It is the third time I have applied for the Senegalese nationality. I still have no answer. My kids always ask me how to get it. We live here, we pay our taxes, and we would like to have our say in selecting our leaders ... "(Interview with MM, Dakar, September 1999).

"It's when I heard the national anthem for Cape Verde for the first time that I remembered that I belonged to a country.... I was born in Senegal, but my origins are Cape Verde. Most of the members of our community know Cape Verde only through the "Morna¹²". (Interview with A. dos Reis, Dakar, September 1999).

Because of the laborious process related to the development and delivery of notice or expected conclusions from the various services through the Division of Seal and Legislation (Division of Civil Affairs and Seal), responsible for the preparation of naturalization acts, the pre-trial investigation of a file takes on average two years:

- The Governor rules in favour or out on the basis of the thorough investigation which is entrusted to the Central Commissioner (Interior Ministry) in the locality where the applicant resides;
- The Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministry of Justice) conducts the applicant's criminal background check prior to the issuance of B1 criminal record;

¹² Folkloric music from the islands popularized by the singer Cesaria Évora.

- Once the naturalization decree is issued, the applicant is expected to present a payment receipt to the Public Revenue Department (Ministry of Economy and Finance), chancery fees amounting to 100,000 francs CFA.

In a little more than thirty years (from 7 October 1971 to October 7, 2002), 592 naturalization decrees have been signed. Note that these naturalization decrees are signed by the President of the Republic. They can be either individual or collective (between eight and fifteen people).

The table below shows that the recent naturalizations include mainly Lebanese and French. Among Africans, there are among the beneficiaries a significant proportion of executives of Dakar-based international institutions (ASECNA, BCEAO, former Air Afrique, etc.).

Naturalization is certainly an alternative to access many benefits, but it does not break off the link between the migrant and his/her original group or modify substantially the look of “new citizens” (See Figure 20).

Migration-Related Discourses

State/ Public Discourses

Senegalese authorities tend to regard emigrants as development agents, especially with respect to urban production such as in the field of construction. However, preliminary statistical data from a large European multi-country research project on migration from Africa to Europe (MAFE) suggest that emigrants are but one of multiple actors whose actions have an important impact on urban production and development in Dakar (Lessault and Mezger 2010:10-12).

While becoming indignant about instances of mismanagement on the part of government officials, Senegalese people tend not to hold their government accountable for, and expect less from it than from their own sacrifices. Rather than waiting for the promises made by politicians to materialize, they tend to rely more on their own creativity, resourcefulness and determination to meet household and personal needs (Fall 2010:9-10).

Popular Discourses

In Senegalese popular discourse, the emigrant is regarded as a symbol of success. According to Riccio (2005:107), popular culture in Senegal portrays migrants as “gold mines;” they are preferred by women and mothers as potential husbands and admired by the young as role models. This attitude towards migration is generalized across the country though regional variation exists. Dakar youth, for instance, tend to be more interested in Western destinations, at the expense of other African countries. Among the Soninke ethnic group, migration is considered to be closely related to achieving a certain social status. France is typically popular among educated elites while people from rural areas tend to migrate to Italy and Spain for work, sometimes following a longer migratory transition that began with the “rural exodus” from the regions upcountry to Dakar.

A certain “philosophy” of openness to the world may be perceived among Senegalese people. The influence of Leopold Sedar Senghor, intellectual and first president of independent Senegal, was

important in this respect. Senghor's vision was that the Senegalese people should be rooted in their own values and cherish their own cultural legacy all the while accepting other cultures and being able to adapt to foreign situations. The teaching of foreign languages (after French, mainly English, Arabic, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German or Russian) within the Senegalese public education system can be seen as being part of this spirit of openness to universal dialogue. It is therefore not surprising to find Senegalese with some knowledge in such languages and this could affect migration aspirations at some level.

Senegalese cultural icons such as musicians Youssou N'Dour, Doudou Ndiaye Rose and Didier Awadi, or sculptor Ousmane Sow Huchard, carry the Senegalese spirit of *teranga*, of openness to the world and the wish to engage in dialogue with others. New generations of Senegalese, who are ever more connected to global ideas through the expansion of the media, have inherited this spirit of openness and internalized this desire to be "world citizens." This, too, is likely to have an impact on the development of migration aspirations.

Senegalese music evokes repeatedly the theme of migration. Examples include Youssou N'dour's « Immigré » (immigrant) and « Solidarité » (solidarity); Thione Seck's « France »; Ouza Diallo's « Modou-Modou » (expression used to refer to migrants); Alioune Kassé's « Modou-Modou »; Assane Mboup's « Warefi tukki » (the obligations of the one who travels); Omar Pène's « Rèr » (lost); Groupe Djubo's « Dan Dolé » (the worker – he who uses his working force/energy); Dial Mbaye's « Touki » (the journey); Ismaïla Lô's « Baol-Baol »; or Cheikh Lô's « Doxandème » (the foreigner). Through such songs, migrants are often praised as "symbols of contemporary society" for the efforts they make to contribute to their families' well-being (Riccio 2001:588). In addition, one of Senegal's private radio stations airs each week a radio broadcast dubbed « Kaddu Modu-Modu » (Emigrants' voice).

The strong presence of migration in popular culture, amounting to a virtual "praise" of emigration, may in turn influence people's subconscious and their attitudes to it. Emigration to developed countries is nowadays one of the major topical issues in the Senegalese popular community. This is the subject for debate everywhere, both in urban centres where almost all the youth are obsessed by the *Modou-Modou*¹³ phenomenon and in the countryside¹⁴ where 70% of rural exodus are directed abroad (ANSD and REMUAO 1995).¹⁴

Indeed, youth increasingly believe that reaching social success is accomplished only by migrating to the West (cf. Fouquet 2007). While daily media takes delight in the abuses related to reckless pursuit of visa through roundabout means, youth consider travelling to other countries in the North to be the only solution presented to them and force their families to join their forces in order to help them "go" (Antoine et al. 1995).

Among young people who wish to emigrate, the main aim is usually to travel to Europe or the United States. In youth slang, they speak of migration as *climbing* or *yéeg*, which is synonymous with *tekk*, whose first meaning is associated with social recognition or success. Many youths are more fearful of undergoing a "social death" by lack of recognition than of encountering physical

¹³ Originally, the term meant seasonal migrants from the Senegalese peanut basin in search of additional income in the big cities like Dakar. Since the early 1990s, this applies to all international migrants whatever their origin is.

¹⁴ The survey stresses that Senegal has lost about – 0.3% of its population aged between 15 and more between 1988 and 1992.

death by undertaking a dangerous attempt to emigrate. During the 2006 phenomenon of heightened boat migration to the Canary Islands, the slogan *Barça ou Barsaq* (“Barcelona or death”) became common among many of those wishing to attempt the journey, often knowing that it involved the likelihood of very high dangers (cf. Fall 2007a; Hernández-Carretero 2008).

Bruno Riccio (2005:105) defines the figure of the *Modou Modou* or *Baol Bao* as: “rural migrants who only know how to trade but nevertheless manage to earn enough money abroad and come back showing off new houses, clothes, big weddings and all the symbols of success”. According to Thomas Fouquet (2007:89), for many young people from Dakar “the migratory journey appears first and foremost as a means to connect to [such an] elsewhere, depository of the attributes of prestige and, as such, permitting the establishment/formation of a financial as well as a symbolic capital.”¹⁵ It appears, however, that the symbolic capital of the elsewhere is mainly reaped upon return to the place of origin, when social recognition is bestowed upon those who are seen as having succeeded financially abroad (Dougnon 2008; Fouquet 2007). Senegalese migrants indeed typically harness the desire to return to the homeland after some time spent abroad. As Riccio (2005:102) explains, triumphant return visits where migrants display the material gains of their migratory success make a strong impact on how emigration is imagined in rural Senegal, creating a “symbolic push factor” that perpetuates emigration from those areas.

Remittances sent by migrants heighten the status of both the migrant and his/her family back in Senegal (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008; Kaag 2008; Riccio 2008). Recent statistical data from the MAFE project show that in Senegal, households with at least one return or one recent migrant¹⁶ are better off than those without (Lessault and Mezger 2010:9). This data does not, however, provide any information on the direction of causality in the migration / household wealth link. This means that it is not possible to ascertain whether household wealth is a product or a promoter of migration.

Meanwhile, Riccio (2005:108-111) points out that there also exist negative images about emigration, Europe or behaving “like a European” also exist. Not everyone idealizes emigration, and some question the ways migrants make their money (e.g. accepting jobs they would not do in Senegal) or the way they spend it (e.g. in consumption rather than investment). In addition, Europeans are criticized for being unsupportive, intolerant or racist towards Africans. Senegalese migrants who adopt behavioural patterns identified as “white” or who question the possibility of return are sometimes reproached by relatives or other migrants with greater moral authority (Vázquez Silva 2008:11).

¹⁵ Translation by the authors.

¹⁶ Defined with respect to the last census data (2002): a “recent migrant” was considered to have gone abroad within the previous 5 years and still remain there.

Research Areas

Research Area with High Emigration: Darou Mousty, Louga

The region of Louga, formed by the historical provinces of Cayor, Ndiambour and Djolof, covers an area of 25,214 square kilometres or 12% of the Senegalese territory. It is the third region of Senegal in terms of area behind Tambacounda and Matam that snatched from it lands formerly located in the boroughs of Dodji and Barkedji (See Figures 21 and 22).

Rainfall that does not last more than three months is between 300-500 millimetres. Louga belongs to the Sahelian zone where temperatures are high throughout the year, particularly in Djolof (Department of Linguere) where heat is legendary. With a population of 803,485 inhabitants in 2008 or 6.8% of the national population, the region of Louga has an average density of 32 inhabitants per square kilometres. One should also note that more than 50% of the total population is under 20-year old.

The rain-fed agriculture, the breeding of small ruminants and fishing are the populations' dominant activities. These activities suffer from two great evils:

- Soil depletion that results from the fact that "farmers no longer grow millet but cowpea [a kind of bean] which is the only real local speculation";
- Shortage of water or salinity of wells which explains why a village like Thioubene is now wiped off the map.

The regional economy is punctuated by weekly markets where local products are marketed and those in neighbouring provinces. In the western part of the region, weekly markets are held from Monday to Sunday in the localities of Gouye Mbeuth, Poto, Gande, Diagué, Niomre, Keur Momar Sarr, and Coki (See Figure 23).

International migration has become, during the decade 1980/1990, an unexpected dimension in Ndiambour. It is based on the success-oriented imaginary of Djily Mbaye who made his fortune in Africa. Pa Djily, as he is fondly called, has radically changed the urban face of Louga with his "palace" and the residential areas built in that capital.

Besides the town of Louga, towns whose names are closely associated with migration are: Niomre Lô and Darou Mousty.

The example of Niomre, which is probably the largest village in Senegal for its number of international migrants, can get a clearer picture of migration among the Ndiambour Ndiambour. In 2009, they were estimated at nearly 900 people, mainly in Europe: Italy, France and Spain in particular.

The first departures targeted France and dates back to the early 1980s with people like El H. Ousmane Kanteye and Demba Diop. They coincided with an unprecedented drought which forced the majority of people to exile themselves to Dakar, Thies and Kaolack.

Gathered under the Association of Emigrants from Niomre whose creation dates back to 1978, the migrants have highly contributed to the local development of the area (cf. Cisse 2004; Ndiaye

2007).¹⁷ Formerly chaired by El Hadji Ousmane Kanteye, the association is now led by two Coordinators: Tall Mango based in Italy and Mbargane Thiam who lives in Spain.

This association contributes significantly to the improvement of local living conditions. The following examples prove it enough:

- In the field of health, the Health Committee notes with satisfaction “with the help of migrants who support the salary of the midwife and made available to the village two ambulances”;
- Migrants support the Parents’ Association in improving learning conditions through allocations of supplies, books, and computer equipments, etc..;
- Migrants are also responsible for fuel to operate the drill built up by the government in 1983 and managed by ASUFOR (Association of Drill Users).

Private investments by migrants are numerous. They are especially visible in the transformation of the habitat which has no cause to be jealous of the residential areas found in urban centres in terms of its quality and equipment.

In terms of productive investments, it is worth noting that many international migrants have mainly invested in real estate and trade, especially in the towns of Louga and Dakar.

Darou Mousty - which is our area of study - belongs to the ancient kingdom of Cayor. It is located in contact with both the forestry-pasture area and groundnut cultivation areas.

As the second city of Muridism and important religious centre, *Darou Mouhty* - as Mame Thierno Birahim who founded it in 1912 named it following instructions from his brother Ahmadou Bamba - is located 25 kilometres away from the holy city of Touba, whose demographic and spatial growth rate is exceptionally important.

Located in the region of Louga, the rural community of Darou Mousty had in 2009 an estimated population of 23,676 inhabitants (2009 Administrative Census) who are primarily engaged in agriculture and trade.

The rural community of Darou Mousty consists of 73 villages, some of which are folded in some districts in Darou Mousty whose people give the names of their villages of origin. Such is the case of Koki Gueye whose inhabitants keep their farmlands which they cultivate during winter ploughing.

Politically, the city of Darou is strongly dominated in the competition for its governance by fratricidal political strife particularly within the ruling Senegalese Democratic Party.¹⁸

¹⁷ See also the web site: <http://www.lougaweb.com/>

¹⁸ The religious city brought people’s attention during the municipal elections held in March through violent clashes between the enemy camps of Modou Diagne Fada and Thierni Lo. The Court of Appeal of Dakar has recently declared void the election of the Rural Community of Ndoyene, thus plunging the electoral constituency and the entire Borough in an appalling atmosphere.

Darou Migrants and Local Development

The importance of volume of international migration is the other dominant feature of Darou. Our interlocutors noted that “there is no family without migrant in Darou Mousty.” International migration has been built up on the basis of family and Sufi relationships places from shopping areas of Rebeuss in Dakar, Marseille in France and New York in the United States of America (Ebin 1993). It soon reaches southern Europe including Italy, which is currently a pivotal country as for the migration of people from Darou.

In addition to supporting their families, migrants’ investments are visible in habitat level. Some returnees have invested in business and cattle breeding. Migrants involved in the comings and goings between their country of residence and Senegal are becoming more common among older migrants. There is also a result of the crisis, an extension of migrants’ stay and increasing number of returns in periods considered to be unusual for holidays.

Among the number of community initiatives taken by the migrants and the Youth Association of Darou Mousty in Italy (AJEDI), there is the creation of the Mutual Loan and Savings Association of Darou Mousty that has now 701 memberships.

The Manager of Mutual Savings and Loan Association of Darou Mousty beyond regrets that “the migrants have now distanced themselves from the mutual do not use it as channel for their remittances since the mutual cannot fulfil this mission ... do not put money into accounts though their families, save or solicit the mutual.” (Interview with Mariama Lo held on June 10, 2009). Among reasons for the situation described by the Manager of the mutual, there have certainly been criticisms on the attitude of local populations whose participation is deemed insufficient, but also and especially the financial weakening of migrants who are increasingly having difficulties in ensuring regularity of their support (Fall 2009).

For their part, Darou migrants settled in Rome also distinguished themselves in the 2000s in garbage collection and transportation of students of the Hut for the Very Young.

Research Area with Low Emigration: Lambaye, Diourbel

A Regional Average Emigration Rate

The region of Diourbel, commonly referred to as *Baol* in memory of the historic kingdom that developed in the area, covers an area of 4,769 square kilometres, which accounts for 2.4% of the national territory. Located in the central part of Senegal, the region is divided into three departments: Bambey, Diourbel and Mbacke. In 1976, three departments of Louga, Kebemer and Linguere were detached from Diourbel to create the region of Louga (See Figure 24).

The region has a Sudano-Sahelian-type weather with a long dry season which only allows, in the absence of perennial rivers, the farming of groundnut and speculations like cowpea over the vast expanses of red soils or *dior* soils.

The evolution of the region’s population shows a steady growth peak in the 2000s when there was a high settlement growth in Touba. With an average of 221 inhabitants per square kilometre, the population density is one of the strongest in the country.

If the town of Diourbel, which is the administrative capital of the region, offers the look of a dead city, Touba, the capital of Muridism - is still considered to be a large *village town* - knows an unprecedented population explosion in Senegal: 462,000 in 2002 and 530,000 in 2007.

The region's population growth is mainly driven by the department of Mbacke and the holy city of Touba. Indeed, the subdivision and equipment program, initiated by the Murid community's religious leader, has continued to attract followers who receive free allocation of plots (See Figure 25).

The urban population resides in the localities of Bambey (13%), Diourbel (55, 6%) and Mbacke (31, 3%)

At the sectarian level, it should be noted, alongside the Muslim majority and Murids, the existence of a Catholic minority in some Serer areas including Bambey and its hinterland. This is symbolized by the unusual presence of pigs in the streets and alleys.

Koranic education in Murid *daaras* is the most wide-spread form of education. This explains why the region of Diourbel had the lowest gross enrolment rate in 2008, pegged at 53.1%, and primary school completion rate estimated at 30, 8% (ANSD 2009c:38-39).

What is strongly noted is the low level of education in French, particularly among girls. While primary education is making progress in mid-rural area, it is also important to note the absence of school facilities in the holy city of Touba because of fierce opposition from the religious leaders of the area.

The SEIB - Society of Industrial Establishment of Baol-turned SUNEOR is the only regional industrial unit. It is dedicated to crushing groundnut, which Diourbel is one of the main production hubs.

Diourbel is the birthplace of Muridism which was implanted in its early stages in the district of Keur Gou Mack- Diourbel before reaching Touba. The mosque built up in the district is one of the stately Murid shrines which welcome faithful all years round, particularly during religious celebrations known as Magal.

At the cultural level, the regional agenda is structured around religious events, the most important of which are: the Great Pilgrimage of Touba, which marks the departure into exile of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, the Pilgrimage of Darou Salam which commemorates the return from exile of the Sheikh and the Pilgrimage of Darou Khoudoss dedicated to the death of the founder of Muridism.

Three forms of migratory flows hold attention in the region of Diourbel:

- Visits to places of worship and pilgrimages that are responsible for regular commuter movements in the religious city, whose highlight is the *grand magal* of Touba that can gather annually 2-3,000,000 faithful;
- Change in residence within the region or departures to other regions
- Arrival of new populations.

The migration to the region of Diourbel is mainly directed to the Department of Mbacke which is the only area recording a positive migration balance (See Figure 26).

These arrivals cover, for the period 1998-2003, nearly 38,000 people coming from Dakar (34.7%), Louga (19.3%), Kaolack (11.3%), and Fatick (8.3%).

Over the same period, populations from Diourbel took the road of exodus to Dakar (47.4%), Thies (17%), Louga (10%), Fatick (8%) and Kaolack (7%) (See Figure 27).

One of the major consequences of the degradation of local environmental conditions is poverty that spreads following rainfall deficits and its impact on rural economy.

One of the notables of Dinguiraye stresses that “the region of Baba Garage has gradually become a Landange (unproductive area) or even a tak (zone without resources). It follows that Baol is now the poorest area of Senegal while in the 1950s groundnut production reached record high ... I remember once my father alone produced 30 tons of groundnuts and 100 tons of millet” (Interview with Modou Ndiaye, May 27, 2009).

The local economic activity is organized around the weekly markets of Lambaye (Thursday), Gawane (Friday), Touba Toul (Saturday) and Bambey Serer (Monday).

International Migration

There is certainly little statistical evidence on international migrants, but anecdotal evidence can help assert that Touba occupies a special place in the Senegalese migration phenomenon. Indeed, it is both a place of departure and return for many international migrants.

It is also relevant to note that many migrant families have settled there to enjoy, in addition, free plots of valuable facilities such as the migrant-funded Matlaboul Fawzeyni hospital.

Many are the returning migrants or engaged in comings and goings who have invested in the holy city. It is also common to hear say that Touba has killed the villages of Cayor and Baol because of the mass exodus departure to the religious city.

Besides the United States of America, Italy and Spain are also popular destinations.

The myth of the *Modou Modou* is perpetuated by official ceremonies of receiving offerings by Dahirra from abroad, but also tours by religious leaders who travel to every corner of the planet at the invitation of international migrants.

Our research area corresponds to the former province of Lambaye. This includes the soils once polarized by the historic capital of the kingdom of Baol.

The expression Lambaye Lambaye, which is used to describe these populations, embodies a specific cultural dimension. It reflects the entrepreneurial spirit or resourcefulness of Wolof sub-ethnic groups from central Senegal: the Baol Baol.

The degradation of the local environmental conditions has led many people in the department of Lambaye to rely on local migration networks in a bid to try their luck in urban centres in Senegal and more recently overseas.

The isolation of the province is combined with a kind of more austere nature which makes it almost impossible for human development.

Rural exodus has been an early response for people, particularly those living in the area of Lambaye, who have engaged in business activities around the port of Dakar, in particular in Pack Lambaye located in former Gambetta Avenue-turned Lamine Gueye Avenue. The Lambaye-Lambaye control today trade in slops which was partly shifted to Pikine.

Lack of local perspectives is the biggest challenge faced by the populations who are no less committed to their land. It follows that the highlight of regional geography is the importance of internal exodus, which is reflected, in some places, through large population losses if not outright disappearance of villages. Ndoungane is one of the villages of Lambaye that has lost a large number of its people in favor of the capital of Muridism. This situation is more pronounced in the neighbouring province of Mbaacol, that is, the borough of Niakhene “where one notes many ghost towns (“raffe” in Wolof language) as Djigual Coure, Malome Keur Demba and Thice where there is only one dwelling left. (Interview with Mr Ndiaye held on May 27, 2009).

International migration is a phenomenon that is growing rapidly in the province of Lambaye. A village like Mekhe Lambaye consists of more than 100 migrants for an estimated population of 2,267 people. These migrants have settled in Europe including France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, etc. (Interviews with ASCOM, July 2010).

Research Area with Immigration History: Golf Sud (Guédiawaye, Dakar)

A Large Host, Departure and Transit Region

The region of Dakar is situated in the peninsula of Cape Verde. It spreads over 550 square kilometres or 0.28% of the national territory.

Dakar is the domain of a pleasant microclimate related to the influence of maritime trade winds that almost guarantees a cool weather annually.

In Dakar, the maximum average of daytime temperatures is 24°C from January to March and 25 and 27°C in April, May and December. During the dry season, temperatures can reach 30°C. It is also during this period that blows the Harmattan weather or continental trade wind that is a hot dry wind coming from the Sahara desert (See Figure 28).

Another characteristic of the geography of Dakar is the presence of shallow groundwater in the inter dune depressions that characterize the landscape. This includes niayes zones that are valuable areas of market gardening and fruits.

In 2007, the population of Dakar was estimated at 2,428,155 inhabitants, of whom 50.1% were men against 49.9% women. This represented 21.4% of 11,360,985 of the population of Senegal. This is the country's most populated region since it is the most equipped with economic, social and

cultural infrastructures. This earned it a very popular destination for rural people while its location earns it also a great location and area of transit for international migrants.

More than three quarters of the population live in the districts of Dakar (39.9%) and Pikine (35.5%) followed by Guediawaye (12.0%) and Rufisque (12.6%).

The average regional density - the highest in the country – is pegged at about 4,500 inhabitants per square kilometre. It varies according to the area covered: 22,569 inhabitants per square kilometre in Guediawaye, 12,337 in Dakar, 9,944 in Pikine and 821 in Rufisque.

97.2% of the population of Dakar live in urban areas against 2.8% who live in the two rural communities located in the Department of Rufisque: Yenne and Sangalkam (See Figure 29).

The growth rate of over 4% recorded between 1976 and 1988 in Dakar has now stabilized at around 2.5%. It is certainly less important but led to a doubling of the population every 25 years.

Capital of West Africa, from 1902 to 1958, and Senegal since 1957 in place of Saint-Louis, the city was created by the Governor Pinet-Laprade in 1857. It was also like Goree and Rufisque, and Saint-Louis, one of the Four Communes of Senegal where the population born there enjoyed French citizenship.

One of the important phases of French settlement in Dakar is the exclusion of indigenous people from the Plateau area and their resettlement in 1914 in the segregation village, which is Medina.

The spatial segregation in days of yore that was inherited from colonization disappeared gradually. Indeed, the opposition between secular European districts (Plateau) and African districts (Medina and Grand Dakar) has given way to a hierarchy based on the degree of development and facilities in the districts and/or living standard for their occupants. The “city” is now distinguished from its historic neighbourhoods and residential areas planned and the “suburbs” which hosts the popular strata in areas sometimes summarily arranged with the look of real suburban villages.

With the Ecochard plan, the city of Dakar has radically changed its face with the eviction of intra-urban slums to Pikine then Guediawaye. The “African districts” on the outskirts of Dakar were cut now by a vast no man’s land filled with new habitat areas: Hann Marist, Parcelles Assainies and Golf, etc.

It is also worth noting that the recognition of the traditional power of the indigenous Lebou survived colonization since the *Serigne Ndakarou* remained an inter-face with the executive.

Dakar is Senegal’s political, economic and cultural capital. It is a macro-cephalous city built up in the image of the former colonial capitals of Africa as Abidjan or Conakry.

Major efforts have, however, been made to relieve the traffic congestion on Dakar. The establishment, in all the districts of the town, of bank branches formerly concentrated in the Plateau area is a perfect illustration.

As Senegal’s first university town, Dakar is home to an impressive number of public and private schools. These attract a student population coming from the Maghreb and all African countries, in particular Gabon.

As the country's administrative capital, Dakar is also Senegal's main economic hub because all infrastructures merge on its soil. It is in the peninsula of Cape Verde that 86% of the country's industrial units are located.

As a high place of national economic activity and international business centre, Dakar, thanks to its deep water port and its international-class airport, is a trade stronghold with the world, especially with Europe.

The case of Senegal is far from being unique in Africa where the informal sector development is inherent to the modern sector's inability to respond to the job needs. It follows that informal activity constitutes the first strategy out of poverty for both rural migrants who have come to settle in the cities and all young people who arrive each year on the job market.

The informal sector - formerly called non-structured sector - is with the government, the largest job provider and first source of income for many Senegalese people. Indeed, one Senegalese worker out of two operates in the informal sector that attracts mostly women and children.

Carried out in family or self-employment, trade, crafts, fishing, crafts recovery, etc., are the main market niches of informal workers that especially welcome those left behind in the modern sector, that is to say those that cannot carry out a professional qualification.

Sandaga, HLM, Colobane are Dakar's main activity hub that eventually spreads to Senegal's suburbs and rural areas. There is indeed no difference in terms of products shown or protagonists between an urban and a weekly market from a village in the heart of Senegal.

The "wild" occupation of the streets that characterizes the informal sector and the shortfall, which is for the government and local governments, the non-payment of business taxes, have led government to consider reorganizing the informal sector.

Interpreted as a ruling prohibiting any commercial activity in the capital, the measure sparked violent clashes in November 2007.

There is evidence that on reporting indefinitely the decision to eliminate the evil, the authorities have probably signed the law in the city with hordes of traders who proclaim loudly their desire to access formal employment that the government is unlikely to offer them.

Upon the political and local authorities' capacity to tackle together the thorny issue of "street trading" or "street occupation" depends, in large part, on social peace in the Senegalese capital, but also on the face of the country's first city.

In addition to being a cosmopolitan city, Dakar is also an important centre for cultural exchanges as a result of a mixture of people from various origins.

Host area and settlement of rural populations and populations from neighbouring countries, Dakar is short of in terms of trade with the regions of Thies and Diourbel.

A one-shot survey conducted in October 2007 by the ANDS gives a clear idea of the importance of population flows during the period ranging from May to October, which accounts for six months.

Internal mobility, which is of great intensity, involved nearly 3,200 people or 0.1% of the population of Dakar. The first is change-related district movement for family and school reasons, but also a desire to align the workplace that affects more women.

The new settlements in Dakar are approximately 66,000 cases, of which 63, 6% are initiated by women. These movements, directed toward the departments of Dakar (61.3%) and Guediawaye (26%), are made by elderly people with 79, 3%, aged less than 30 years old.

The populations, who settle in the town of Dakar in favour of rural exodus, come from the urban world as well as the countryside. 78% of those from urban centres within the department moved into Rufisque while 24, 3% of the people of rural origin settle in Dakar against 23.2% in Pikine.

Finally, it is worth noting that new settlements in Dakar are related to returns (68% are former inhabitants of Dakar), the arrival of foreigners (11.9%) and populations from upcountry, including those from Thies (5, 8%), Ziguinchor (3.1%) and Diourbel (2.9%).

The motives of these settlements are of three types: family (47, 2%), work (19.7%) and job search (2.5%).

The one-shot survey conducted by the Department of National Statistics and Demography from May to October 2007 provides a more accurate understanding of international migration that involved 15,703 people from Dakar. These migrants are recruited by 57.1% from the age group 15-29 years and are mostly men, with women more represented in the age group 15-29 years.

At the geographical level, departures are directed to Europe (71% for men and 69% women), ahead of African countries.

Along with departures, it is noted that Dakar has always been a host destination for international migrants because of its geographical location, prestige inherited from colonization, but also because of its cultural vitality.

This explains why half of the international migrants recorded in Senegal during the years 1997-2002 had settled in the Senegalese capital.

The particularity of migrants living in Dakar is their specialization in economic niches of their own: fruits and vegetables for Guineans, automobile equipments for Nigerians etc.

There is also a group of migrants according to their countries of origin that reflects the existence of migration systems consolidated over the years.

The French are the largest European population living in Dakar and Senegal because of the length of the relationship with France. They are mainly located in the residential districts of Almadies, Plateau and Mermoz-Sacre-Coeur.

As for the Lebanese, they are concentrated in the Plateau where they are engaged in wholesale business and/or run big companies.

Mauritanians have begun a return since the restoration of diplomatic ties between Senegal and its northerly neighbour that broke off following the 1989 events. Before that date, they controlled all the local shops (stores) in urban areas which have been largely taken over by Guineans.

Meanwhile, Guinean immigration into Dakar and Senegal dates back longer. It was political before being linked to economic reasons. The Guineans distinguished themselves in the informal street trade and are grouped in the inner cities of Reubeuss, Grand Dakar and in the suburbs.

The Cape Verdeans are a large and relatively integrated community and their cultural influence on the youth of Dakar is very high. They are active mainly in services and construction trade.

The recent settlement of the Chinese is a new deal which highly participates in the development of informal trade along the Allees du Centenaire which has turned a real *China Street*.

Migrants from Dakar have a clear preference for northern countries, including America and Southern Europe, which have taken it over from France.

The Municipal district of Golf Sud, which is our study area, appears in many respects as a shortcut to the urban landscape of the Senegalese capital. Located halfway between the city itself and the suburb, Golf Sud consists in architectural terms of four sets: the so-called popular districts, “the housing developments”, the “cities” and the residential districts.

The “popular districts” host the populations that were formerly expelled from the intra-urban slums of Dakar in the 1970s: Fith Mith, Gulf Sud.

The “housing developments” that correspond to the districts of Parcelles Assainies called “Units” which were built up as part of the Habitat Program of the greatest number supported by the World Bank in the 1980s.

The “cities” are the housing areas built up on the same model by state-owned property developers (HLM Las Palmas, Hamo, Teachers’ City, etc.) or private property developers (SHS). These include houses acquired under hire purchase contracts through the channel of the Banque de l’Habitat du Sénégal (Housing Bank of Senegal).

The luxury neighbourhoods host the well-offs. This is the case, for example, of Jardins de Camberene, Cite Faysal-turned Senegalese state property, which houses Senegalese officials.

Wedged between the Great coast and Great Niaye zone of Pikine, the town of Golf Sud, which gets its name from the nearby former golf course now decommissioned and rebuilt around the ponds of Niaye zone of Pikine, faces significant environmental problems. Indeed, the habitat areas bordering the lake depression or niaye zone are throughout the year mosquito-infested while residents of the Atlantic coast watch helplessly the destruction of beefwood designed to hinder the advance of the sea but also the extraction of wild marine sand by shady carters.

In the absence of industrial activity, the town of Golf Sud offers the appearance of a vast dormitory city for “cities” staff and many informal workers who often have to travel to Dakar. The main areas of activity are the markets, the most important of which is that of the Case located at the round-

about of Camberene, the numerous artisan workshops of all kinds as well as the commerce shops lining the main roads, etc.

Research Area with specific Human Rights situation

Orkadiéré (Matam), a Peripheral Area

Located in north-eastern Senegal, the region of Matam belongs to the part named *Fouta* which corresponds to the country's oldest population hub and the site of the first Senegalese kingdom: the Tekrou. It is also the gateway to Islam that shaped the local culture.

Founded in 2002, the region of Matam covers an area of 29,616 square kilometres, or about one seventh of the national territory. It is now the country's largest region. The terrain is relatively flat compared to the rest of the country. It is characterized by a vast plain incised by valleys. There are three highly differentiated eco-geographical zones:

- The River Valley or "*danda mayo*" is made of depressions and micro-reliefs;
- The Ferlo area is lateritic for the most part of the region and sandy in the western margins;
- The "dieri" or intermediate zone that corresponds to the non-fordable river flooding. It is relatively empty but welcomes large villages along the No. 3 national highway.

Climatically, the region is located in the Sahelian and Sudano-Sahelian area, which gives it a diverse natural environment and a rich and quite favourable ecological environment (See Figure 30).

Coupled with the continued decline in rainfall, desert encroachment has a negative impact on the Sahelian environment which is already heavily marked by drought. It is in a move to solve this terrible equation that Mali, Mauritania and Senegal have established the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) that has two major achievements to its credit:

- The Diama dam designed to prevent rise in salt water coming from the estuary of the river, to hold back fresh water in a bid to increase irrigation potentials or recharge basins and fossil lakes running along the river;
- The Manantali dam whose mission is to ensure, during the rainy season, retaining reservoir, to make possible, through appropriate releases, navigability of the river, to irrigate farmland during the dry season and generate electricity for the capitals (Dakar, Bamako and Nouakchott).

The Senegal River borders Mauritania. Only few spots Senegalese villages are located on the right bank. Such a situation is often a source of land disputes, which resulted in the 1989-1991 crises.

In 1989, a clash between farmers and pastoralists that claimed deaths of people along the valley sparked manhunt by the communities of both countries. That led Mauritania to expel its black African citizens who fled to Senegal. Estimated at 650,000, their return was initiated in 2008 under the auspices of the UNHCR.

The crisis between the two countries is certainly resolved politically, but a return to hostility cannot be excluded because the underlying and periodical tensions between populations on either side of the river are still regarded as a watershed. Indeed, the Valley residents complain about their relative neglect by the Senegalese government and the many humiliations by Mauritians (white) in retaliation for support given to black Mauritians (the Beïdanes).

In 2007, the population of the region of Matam was estimated at 492,032 inhabitants, comprising 52.4% women and 58.5% children under 20 years old. The region's natural growth rate increase was pegged at 3.02% (See Figure 31).

Two major ethnic groups make up the regional population: the Haalpular, who are the majority ethnic group, and the Soninke, a minority with their own districts in the villages.

The average density is 17 inhabitants per square kilometres. There is a large concentration of population along the river or *dande mayo* and some large villages in the Dieri. The urban population is low as indicated in the table below (See Figure 32).

A former stop for the Senegal River, the town of Matam has remained the administrative capital of the region but lost its influence because of the economic rise of Ouro Sogui. As an important road junction, this rapid growth has been made possible because of its position, a large shopping centre as a result of international migrants' investments.

The French settlement in St. Louis, in Senegal, from the 17th century had a considerable impact on the region including development of cash crops at the expense of food crops. Because of lack of industrial fabric, the rain-fed subsistence agriculture remains people's main activity.

Like any peripheral region, the Mid-Valley appears to be the victim of the national development plan which has always favoured the Atlantic facade at the expense of the periphery. Among the most difficult social problems, there are:

- Lack of employment that fosters the choice of rural exodus or international migration, particularly among young people;
- Land issue which is a source of tension on both sides of the river, especially since the development of Senegal;
- Resettlement often badly experienced by indigenous Wolof populations who control commercial activity, including retail distribution.

If the region of Matam is mainly populated by ethno-linguistic Halpular, the various villages that host Soninke minorities have their own neighbourhoods.

The migration history of the Senegal River Valley indicates that the populations of the Valley are among, along with the Mandjack of Casamance, the first Senegalese workers in France. They arrived in France soon after World War I following the lifting of the ban on landing of seamen employed in the home ports of the transatlantic ocean-going (Diarra 1968).

It is noted that the largest migration from the Senegal Valley dates back from the 1970s. This migration process that spread to other African countries can be linked to important events that distinguish three major waves:

- Movements of populations driven by drought and/or impoverishment of the countryside.
- Movements in consequent to structural adjustment policies that resulted from employment crisis.
- Mobility following the economic liberalization that led to the destruction of sectors such as agriculture and large manufacturing companies.

No village in the valley is spared from internal and international mobility that has emerged as a credible alternative to poverty.

The experience acquired by the halpular and Soninke ethnic groups whose migration and mobilization tradition for developing the lands of origin are well established and are a major issue in the region (Daum 1993; Lanly 1998; Quiminal 1991). Indeed, the village of migrants' associations, whose involvement in the development of their land is a feature of Fouta, function as a true civil society. Are they not the ones that earned Matam its erection as Senegal's eleventh administrative region?

The knock-on effects of migration on the regional level are visible everywhere: school infrastructure, health, water, etc.

The actions undertaken for over thirty years by migrants have significantly contributed to the survival of native villages.

If the success achieved in improving the living conditions of populations is real, the lack of complementarity between the projects initiated around neighbouring villages is a major constraint. Indeed, rivalry between village associations leads to a dispersion of resources and energy and a notable lack of coordination of development activities. As a result, whatever the merit of the achievements, they cannot ensure sustainable development, let alone reverse the migration trend.

A fine example of the spatial impact of migration is the transformation of the former settlement of Ourou Sogui into an important commercial centre. It owes its dynamism to investments by international migrants, particularly those who have made fortunes in Africa, trading in precious stones (Bredeloup 1995b; Sall 2004).

Moreover, though very beneficial in improving the lives of villages, migration cannot be regarded as a panacea. To ensure sustainable development, many migrants' associations have to endeavour and develop a synergy between government, development partners and local people on the basis of better articulated and more consistent inter-communal programs, especially in the field of agriculture.

Decentralization policy has not yet produced the effects expected in the field of regional development, but the announcement of the imminent exploitation of the phosphates of Ndendory arouses

lot of hopes. It can, however, be argued that very little will it slow down expatriation that will long remain a data base of the local society.

Orkadiere is a Fulani area (88%) where cattle breeding is the main activity. Rain-fed agriculture is side by side with irrigated agriculture in the village areas.

Like the villages in Damga, Orkadiere is a great emigration hub: 1,079 of a total population of 32,533 people. The migration space of local people has gradually expanded. France, which hosted the pioneers of the migration, is home to more than half of the migrants surveyed in the borough. Australia, Zambia, Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo Kinshasa, Spain, Italy and more recently the U.S. host a limited number of Orkadiere nationals.

The contribution of migrants to local development is done within the framework of associative structures, the first of which are ADERCO (Association for the Development and Nationals Orkadiere Nationals) and UROF (Union of Orkadiere Nationals in France). As real local development players, these associations contribute to improving profitably the living environment by offsetting the absence of the State.

Many analysts believe that had there not been migration, Orkadiere and Damga would have already been wiped off the map of Senegal from top to bottom.

A migration flux to ponder over is that of the current President of the Rural Council, a "Congolese returnee" who has invested in hotels and real estate. His success story feeds undoubtedly mad dreams of young villagers who see migration as the main solution to the crisis.

Conclusion

Closely related to the degradation of living conditions of households, the rapid growth of Senegalese international migration is linked to motivations beyond the economic dimension. The meaning attributed to emigration has evolved in time and space: from education-related to work-oriented mobility, migration has come to be regarded a livelihood-strategy at the family level. Migrant source regions have expanded and destinations have become more diversified.

The expatriation of different groups remains, as shown by the local specificities, highly structured around ethnic and regional networks.

The myth of the migrant is today of paramount importance to contemporary Senegalese society.

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FIGURE 1- MAP OF SENEGAL





FIGURE 2- EVOLUTION OF THE SENEGALESE POPULATION 1970 – 2005 (ROUNDED TO CLOSEST '000)*

	Total	Male	Female
1970	4 395 000	2 110 000	2 285 000
1975	4 973 000	2 387 000	2 586 000
1980	5 652 000	2 713 000	2 939 000
1985	6 431 000	3 087 000	3 344 000
1990	7 298 000	3 576 000	3 722 000
1995	8 347 000	4 090 000	4 257 000
2000	9 583 000	4 695 000	4 887 000
2005	10 818 000	5 301 000	5 517 000

* Total numbers may not add up because of the rounding


Source: Population calculations by ANSD, with data from DPS (Direction de la Prévision de la Statistique) and MEF (Ministère de l'Économie et les Finances). Adapted from: http://www.ansd.sn/publications/annuelles/population-du-Senegal/population_Senegal_1970_2005.pdf (Accessed June 2nd, 2010).

FIGURE 3- EVOLUTION OF THE SENEGALESE POPULATION 1970 – 2005



Source: Population calculations by ANSD, with data from DPS (Direction de la Prévision de la Statistique) and MEF (ministère de l'Économie et les Finances). Adapted from : http://www.ansd.sn/publications/annuelles/population-du-Senegal/population_Senegal_1970_2005.pdf (Accessed June 2nd, 2010).

FIGURE 4- AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SENEGALESE POPULATION IN 2008 (PROJECTION)




Source: Elaborated from ANSD data (ANSD 2009b:25).

FIGURE 5- POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN SENEGALESE REGIONS OF RELEVANCE TO THE EUMAGINE STUDY

Region	Population (2008)	Share of country's population (%)	Surface (km ²)	Share of country's surface (%)	Population density (km ²) in 2008
Dakar	2 482 294	21,0	546	0,3	4545
Diourbel	1 274 490	10,8	4 895	2,5	260
Louga	803 485	6,8	25 214	12,8	32
Matam	506 923	4,3	28 995	14,7	17


Source: Extracted from table in (ANSD 2009b:26).

FIGURE 6- EVOLUTION OF URBAN POPULATION AND URBAN POPULATION GROWTH IN SENEGAL




Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank data (<http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4> – Accessed 10 June 2010).

FIGURE 7- LITERACY RATES IN SENEGAL BY GENDER (% POPULATION 15 AND ABOVE), 1988-2006



Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank data (<http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4> – Accessed 10 June 2010).

FIGURE 8- LITERACY RATES IN SENEGAL BY AREA (% POPULATION 15 AND ABOVE), 1995-2006



Source: Elaborated from ANSD data: ESAM I, ESAM II, ESPS.

FIGURE 9- TOWN/COUNTRY MIGRATORY FLOWS

Residence background	Number of immigrants (arrivals)	%	Number of emigrants (departures)	%	Migration net	Total net	%
Urban back-ground	1,466,798	53.2	1,281,045	46.5	185,753	2,747,843	49.8
Urban Dakar	877,330	31.8	720,466	26.2	156,864	1,597,796	29.0
Other cities	589,468	21.4	560,579	20.3	28,889	1,150,047	20.8
Rural back-ground	2,767,579	4.8	1,476,666	53.5	- 185,753	1,290,913	50.2
Ensemble	2,757,711	100.0	2,757,711	100.0	0	5,515,422	100.0

Source: ESAM 2004, DPS

FIGURE 10- INTER-REGIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS

Region	Number of immigrants	%	Number of emigrants	%	Migration net	Total net	%
Dakar	952,277	32.5	748,357	27.1	203,920	1,700,634	29.0
Ziguinchor	121,853	4.2	185,303	6.7	- 63,450	307,156	5.2
Diourbel	386,871	13.2	287,506	10.4	99,365	674,377	11.5
Saint-Louis	189,903	6.5	204,902	7.4	- 14,999	394,228	6.7
Tambacounda	128,443	4.4	99,740	3.6	28,703	183,805	3.9

Kaolack	302,472	10.3	348,054	12.6	-45,582	650,526	11.1
Thies	342,267	11.7	367,895	13.3	-25,628	710,162	12.1
Louga	146,824	5.0	210,255	7.6	-63,431	357,079	6.1
Fatick	130,356	4.5	136,743	5.0	-6,387	267,099	4.6
Kolda	228,043	7.8	169,582	6.1	58,461	397,625	6.8
Total	2,929,309	100.0	2,929,309	100.0	0	5,858,618	100.0

Source: ESAM 2004, DPS

FIGURE 11- SENEGAL: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRATION FLOWS AND MAJOR DESTINATIONS






FIGURE 12- GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS RECORDED BETWEEN 1992 AND 1997




(Source: ESAM 2004, DPS)

FIGURE 13- DISTRIBUTION IN % OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BY SEX AND AGE




(Source: ESAM 2004, DPS)

FIGURE 14- ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS IN%




(Source: ESAM 2004, DPS)

FIGURE 15- DESTINATION OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BY SEX




(Source: ESAM 2004, DPS)

FIGURE 16- SENEGALESE MIGRATION IN THE UEMOA AREA IN %




(Source: ESAM 2004, DPS)

FIGURE 17- PROVISION OF TRAVEL FEES OF MIGRANTS BY SEX IN %



(Source: ESAM 2004, DPS)

FIGURE 18- TOP 10 COUNTRIES THAT HOST SENEGALESE IN THE WORLD



(Source: drafted out from various documents)

FIGURE 19- FOREIGN PRESENCE IN SENEGAL IN 1993

Burkina Faso	3 143
Cote d'Ivoire	2 808
Guinea	45 261
Mali	7 293
Mauritania	552
Niger	534
Nigeria	2 214
Benin	994
Cape Verde	1 763
The Gambia	6 209
Ghana	292
Guinea-Bissau	7 122
Sierra Leone	78
Togo	89
North Africa	1 317
Central Africa	2 521
Europe	17 611
Other countries	16 552
Total	116 353

(Source: EMUS, DPS survey)

FIGURE 20- BENEFICIARIES OF THE SENEGALESE NATIONALITY IN 2000 AND 2001

Country of origin	2000	2001	Total
Benin	1	3	4
Burkina Faso	-	1	1
Brazil	-	1	1
Congo	1	1	2
Cote d'Ivoire	1	-	1
France	4	6	10
Guinea	-	1	1
Lebanon	11	18	29
Madagascar	-	1	1
Morocco	-	3	3
Mali	1	2	3
Russia	-	1	1
Togo	-	1	1

Tunisia	-	1	1
Yougoslavia	1	-	1
Total	20	40	60

Source: shifting through DACS- MJGS data

FIGURE 21- MAP OF SENEGAL (POLITICAL)





FIGURE 22- OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH AREAS

	HE Area with high-emigration rates	LE socio-economic area with low emigration	SIH Area with strong immigration history	SHRS Area with specific human rights situation
Administrative region	LOUGA	DIORBEL	DAKAR	MATAM
Historic or traditional name	NDIAMBOUR, GUET/CAYOR, DJOLOFF	BAOL	NDAKAROU	DAMGA
Department	DAROU MOUSTY S = 3823 km ² P = 215 648 D = 56 	BAMBEY S = 1351 km ² P = 242 082 D = 181 	GUEDIAWAYE S = 12,7 km ² P = 286 989 D = 22 569 	KANEL S = 96 650 km ² P = 11 161 D = 8,7 
Notes	PEANUT BASSIN strongly affected by the crisis Diourbel is ranked ahead of Louga by ESAM II, but the migration process is certainly more impressive and/or visible in the region of Louga. Note the non-renewal of statistics for nearly 10 years.		POLITICAL CAPITAL of FWA from 1895 to 1960, and in Senegal since 1957	RIVER VALLEY VALLEE border with Mauritania and Mali
			According to SES 2007, half of international migrants reside in Dakar.	Ties with neighboring countries (Mali, Mauritania) give a personal touch to migration traffic
RESEARCH AREAS	DAROU MOUSTY P = 23,676 HH = 2,430 S = 412.9 km ²	LAMBAYE P = 27,293 HH = 2,599 S = 424 km ²	GOLF SUD P = 71,017 HH = 9,238 S = 4.1 km ²	ORKADIERE P = 32,533 HH = 3,292 S = 288 km ²
Notes	The real name of the city is Darou Moushty. Second most important holy city of the Mourides	Main city of the old Baol empire	New city between the City of Dakar and the suburbs	

FIGURE 23- MAP OF DAROU MOUSTY – LOUGA

Demography

Population	23 076
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Village name (73)	Population
Touba Pétégne	63
Arafaat	524
Keur Serigne Bara	149
Tatte	43
Darou Salam Diop	84
Fanghé	181
Diory 2	110
Mbayéne Ngoulangoul	81
Mésséré Thiam	43
Darou Kratiel	276


Dimiyatt	83
Ndame lo	80
Thiarène	121
Diory 1	14
Sébré Cissé	18
Nébodji	36
Diatmé K. Makhoudia Kane	26
Dara Diatmé	154
Keur Bassirou Thiam	128
Keur Madieumb Ndiaye	126
Beubeune	248
Thiouky	86
Darou Diop 2	411
Mbapp	88
Tal Tal	150
Santhiou Tatte	83
Ndangou Peulh	326
Lass	133
Yérew	48
Sébré Fack	270
Thiaméne 1	319
Goudy Pèye	40
Boustane Diagne	73
Nguidith	128
Diantmé Thiaméne	74
Koki Guéye	209
Nganado Bibi	107
Ndiba	52
Khanda	47
Contéyène	34
Diatmé Diop	173
Ndougor	298
Thioly ngoulangoul	162
Sanossy	499
Madina	338
Touba Guéye	115
Darou Rahmane	280
Keur Mor Niang	89
Mbéguéré	248
Wadéne	240
Sarsara	594

Dara Thioly	419
Darou Ndiaye	362
Guemess	103
Massar Diop	100
Ndangou Ouolof	487
Songhane	310
Keur Macoumba fall	463
Darou Sall 2	115
Mbarakane	115
Thyllène	41
Boulel Seck	253
Ndame Sanossy	158
Darou Diop 1	55
Diwane Sylla	1119
Dième	287
Keur Aliou Ndiaye	417
Thiabouguel	549
Darou Mousty	9381
Mbèye Thiabouguel	24
Thioly Diagne	213
Yary Dakhar	237

FIGURE 24- MAP OF LAMBAYE - DIOURBEL

Demography

Population	30 140
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Liste des villages (61)	Population
Lambaye Pey	2267
Lambaye Escale	254
Keur Daour Sall	270
Keur Samba Guèye	717
Keur Mor Sellé	327
Keur Samba Gou Ndaw	90
Keur Daouda Ndiaye	331
Diawrigne	178
Tieppe Panathie	489
Mbadiane Gora	278
Garajou Mbouso	383
Calom	178
Ndialigué Lambaye	1683
Mekhé Lambaye	456

Mérina Diop	216
Thieppe Parba	1056
Tieppe Ndiawrigne	542
Ndieng	411
Ndiargua Lambaye	745
Thieul	72
Mbousso Ndir	1076
Thialla	152
Mbadiane Samba Awa	706
Tassar	73
Diokhane	1062
Keur Ségue Ndiaye	478
Thiénène	195
Diam Tchialda	373
NdoIndol 2	393
Darou Ndiaye	38
Keur Ibra Khoyane	114
Thiéno Labeth	227
Ndougane	114
Ndaga	203
Mbadiane Gouye Dalli	158
Touba Loène	99
Keur Coly Diouf	570
Mbalmi 2	982
Mbalmi 3	359
Mbalmi 1	213
Santhie Parba	294
Parba	592
Ngane Ngom	207
Ngouye Lambaye	659
Mboubane	904
Ngandial 2	247
Ngandial 1	683
Golkoté	282
Keur Ndiack	67
Keur Pothié	75
Thieppe Thiamb	238
Keur Khaly Moustapha	171
Pouniar	695
Dagaye Touré	389
Ndialigué Mérina	887

Mbtal	908
Ngane Lambaye	312
Tougouthie	477
Niakhap	690
Maka Tasar	395
Ndondol Codou Goye	1194

FIGURE 25- POPULATION, DENSITIES AND ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATE: 1988-2003 IN DIOURBEL

Region	Population in 2003	%	Surface area in square kilometer	Densities	Rate % 88-02	Rate % 88-03
Bambey	242,082	22.5	1,351	181	1.6	1.4
Diourbel	209,550	1.4	1,175	181	1.1	0.9
Mbacké	625,222	58.1	2,243	266	10.9	11.0
Region	1, 076,874	100.0	4,769	221	5.0	4.9

Source: Projections from RGPH 2002 / DPS

FIGURE 26- INTENSITIES OF INTRA-REGIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS (RECENT MIGRATION)

REGIONS	Number of immigrants (arrivals)	%	Number of emigrants (departures)	%	Net migration	Total migration	%
Bambey	1,623	7.0	1,2214	52.9	-1,0591	1,3837	30.0
Diourbel	4,031	17.5	8,526	36.9	-4,495	1,2557	27.2
Mbacké	1,7428	75.5	2,342	10.1	1,5086	1,9770	42.8
Total	2,3082	100.0	2,3082	100.0	0	4,6164	100.0


Source: SES 2006, p.17.

FIGURE 27- DIOURBEL: INTENSITIES OF INTRA-REGIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS (RECENT MIGRATION)

REGIONS	Number of immigrants (or entrances)	%	Number of emigrants (or exits)	%	Migration net	Total migration	%
Dakar	1,3178	34.7	1,2663	47.4	515	25,841	40.0
Fatick	3,143	8.3	2,171	8.1	972	5,314	8.2
Kaolack	4,295	11.3	1,844	6.9	2,451	6,139	9.5
Kolda	385	1.0	534	2.0	-149	919	1.4
Louga	7,370	19.4	2,708	10.1	4,662	10,078	15.6
Matam	335	0.9	383	1.4	-48	718	1.1
Saint Louis	701	1.8	743	2.8	-42	1,444	2.2
Tambacounda	579	1.5	778	2.9	-199	1,357	2.1

Thiès	7,338	19.3	4,541	17.0	2,797	11,879	18.4
Ziguinchor	614	1.6	365	1.4	249	979	1.5
Total	37,938	100.0	26,730	100.0	11,208	64,668	100.0

FIGURE 28- MAP OF GOLF SUD – GUEDIAWAYE, DAKAR




Demography of Golf Sud	
Population	71 017
Households	9238
Districts	Population
Cité Atépa Mill	720
Cité des Enseignants	2429
Cité Fadia	4366
Cité Fayccal	310

Fithj Mith	6570
Golf Sud	9661
Guentaba	3114
Cité Hamo 1	1574
Cité Hamo 2	1559
Cité Hamo 3	1433
HLM Las Palmas	5424
Cité Douane	1250
Jardins Cambérène	188
Parcelles Assainies Unité 1	5238
Parcelles Assainies Unité 2	4525
Parcelles Assainies Unité 3	3386
Parcelles Assainies Unité 4	4239
Parcelles Assainies Unité 5	4982
Parcelles Assainies Unité 6	7821
Cité SHS	1824
Station 10	404
TOTAL	71 17

FIGURE 29- EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION RESIDING IN THE REGION OF DAKAR BETWEEN 1976 AND 2007

	1976	1988	2002	2007
Residing population	892, 127	1, 488,941	2, 167, 793	2, 428 155
Growth rate in %	-	4, 4%	2, 7%	2, 3%

FIGURE 30- MAP OF ORKADIÈRE - MATAM



Démographie

Population	32 533
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Villages(19)	Population
Ballel	607
Barkev	521
Diella	2 252
Ganguel Soule	2 250
Gassebery	1 005
Goumal	1 587
Gouriki Coliyabe	1 332

Gouriki Samba Diom	601
Orkadiere	4 715
Padalal	2 149
Polel Aouloube	378
Polel Diaoube	1 988
Sinthiou Polel	542
Vendou Bosseabe	4 210
Wally Dialla Samba	525
Oulde	87
Sinthiane Dioude	70
Barkatou	1 000
Aïnoumadi et Fass	432

FIGURE 31- EVOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL POPULATION BETWEEN 1976 AND 2008

Year	1976	1988	2002	2007	2008
Resident population	178,640	229,188	424,106	492,032	506,921
Growth rate in %	-	2.2	3.3	3.02	-

Source: RGPHs 1976, 1988 and 2002 and demographic projections for 2008.

FIGURE 32- REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY LOCALITY AND SEX IN 2007

	Male	Female	Total
Region of Matam	236,161	255,871	492,032
Urban area	33,325	38,093	71,418
Rural area	202,836	245,072	447,908